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[T]he United States pledges before you-and therefore to the World-its
determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma-to devote its entire
heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man
shall not be dedicated to his death but consecrated to his life.'
Dwight D. Eisenhower
I. INTRODUCTION
International arms control efforts have reduced the nuclear balance
of terror and even offered a glimpse of the much-vaunted but elusive
peace dividend.2 These efforts are among the few remaining bipartisan
foreign policy issues embraced by conservatives and liberals alike.3 This
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1. The remarks of President Dwight D. Eisenhower in an address before the
United Nations General Assembly on December 12, 1953.
2. See ARMS CONTROL: TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY (Jeffrey A. Larsen & Greg-
ory J. Rattray eds., 1996); KERRY M. KARTCHNER, NEGOTIATING START: STRATEGIC
ARMS REDUCTION TALKS AND THE QUEST FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY (1992).
3. See, e.g., Antonio F. Perez, To Judge Between the Nations: Post Cold War
Transformations in National Security and Separation of Powers-Beating Nuclear
Swords into Plowshares in an Imperfectly Competitive World, 20 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 331, 337 n.15 (1997); Marian Nash (Leich), Arms Control and Disarma-
ment: Nuclear Materials Security and Warhead Dismantlement, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 89,
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"motherhood and apple pie" objective has purposefully been pursued by
succeeding administrations, and it is regarded by many as one of the
great foreign policy achievements of our time. And so it is.
We are, however, witnessing the unraveling of unforeseen, albeit
serious, consequences of Russian-US arms control, in the form of nu-
clear pollution. This Article addresses one aspect of this phenomena by
examining how the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),4 perhaps
the most important and successful arms reduction treaty between Russia
and the United States, has affected the nuclear pollution of the Arctic
Ocean, particularly in the area of the shallow Barents and Kara Seas.
Unlike earlier arms control agreements that focused on test bans
and preventing the spread of nuclear arms to non-nuclear countries,
5
START, for the first time in post-cold war history, aimed at reducing the
number of nuclear weapons and warheads including submarine launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Since the reduction of SLBMs necessarily
entails the disarming and decommissioning of many US and Russian
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), a legislative environmental impact
assessment (LEIA) was produced for START. 6 It was, however, con-
fined to environmental impacts within the United States and did not ex-
amine the extraterritorial impact of the START-ordered reduction of
SLBMs. The assessment thus did not address the decommissioning of
thirty-one Russian nuclear submarines and the waste streams resulting
from this exercise on the internationally-important Arctic Ocean. A
fuller environmental evaluation may have avoided or eased some of the
difficult and expensive environmental problems that now confront the
implementation of START.
92 (1997); J. Stephan Wood, The Breakdown of Weapons Control Regimes?, 89 Am.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 380, 392 (1995).
4. Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31,
1991, entered into force Dec. 5, 1994, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-20, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), 16 U.N. DISARMAMENT Y.B., app. II, 450 (1991) [hereinafter
START].
5. See ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, ARMS CONTROLS AND NATIONAL SECURITY,
AN INTRODUCTION 25 (1989). The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks H (SALT 111972-79)
put caps on the number of Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs)
allowed on each missile, as well as limitations on the number of missiles overall (MIRVs
are small warheads located inside a larger missile). SALT I (1969-72), however, limited
the number of missile launchers without limiting warheads or other weapon technology.
See id. See also Astrid Wendlandt, Pacifying Russia: International Aid and NATO Ex-
pansion, 22 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 131, 134 (1998).
6. See discussion infra Part V.B (regarding legislative environmental impact
statements and the National Environmental Policy Act).
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Part II of this Article will review the extent of past nuclear dump-
ing in the Arctic, and discuss future concerns. It will analyze the extent
to which the disarmament and consequent decommissioning of nuclear
submarines pursuant to START have added to existing environmental
problems caused by past nuclear dumping. Part III will discuss the pres-
ent environmental quality of the Arctic based on recent studies of radio-
active pollution. Part III also will examine Russia's lack of facilities to
deal with present and future nuclear waste. Part IV will review the inter-
national bi- and trilateral measures taken to address the environmental
problems of the Arctic. It will focus on the billions of dollars being spent
by the United States to remedy environmental problems that obstruct the
implementation of START.
Part V contends that an environmental impact assessment of the
international effects of START would have revealed these problems,
which then could have been dealt with more efficiently. Although
American case law indicates that future treaties may not be subject to
legally mandated environmental impact assessments, Part V argues that
the United States should nonetheless adopt a more comprehensive ap-
proach to the future international environmental impacts of arms control
treaties. Some form of global environmental impact assessment for arms
control treaties is a political and environmental necessity that the United
States has ignored at considerable cost. The present global hazards
caused by nuclear pollution in the Arctic cannot be solved just by the
United States, Russia, and Norway. It is an international problem that
calls for international cooperation. International environmental impact
assessments, by drawing attention to Russia's inability to remedy its
abuse of the Arctic, will likely elicit greater international cooperation
than has hitherto been the case.
II. THE RADIOACTIVE POLLUTION OF THE ARCTIC
OCEAN
Soviet nuclear pollution of the Arctic is well documented.7 The
pollution has been caused by accidents on land that released radioactive
7. See, e.g., A.V. Yablokov et al., Facts and Problems Related to the Dumping of
Radioactive Waste in the Seas Surrounding the Territory of the Russian Federation:
Materials from a Government Report on the Dumping of Radioactive Waste, Commis-
sioned by the President of the Russian Federation, Oct. 24, 1992, Decree No. 613
(Greenpeace Russia trans., 1993) [hereinafter Yablokov Report] (on file with the Colo-
rado Journal of International Environmental Law & Policy).
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material into the Arctic environment, 8 by land-based discharges of ra-
dioactive pollutants into rivers that later migrated into the neighboring
Arctic seas; 9 and by the Soviet Navy. The.Yablokov Report, written af-
ter the Fifteenth Consultative Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, documents the
frightening extent to which dumping of various kinds took place be-
tween 1958 and 1992.10 The report recounts how the huge Russian nu-
clear fleet, the largest in the world, used the shallow Barents and Kara
Seas of the Arctic Ocean to dispose of its nuclear waste, including un-
safe reactors.
Russian submarines remain a significant source of pollution. The
fleet of over 140 retired nuclear submarines moored in the Russian naval
graveyard ports of Murmansk, in the Barents Sea of the Arctic Ocean,
and Vladivostok, in the Sea of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, are of par-
ticular concern.11 These shipyards do not have safe facilities for storing
the spent nuclear waste generated by nuclear submarines. While military
secrecy surrounds their operations, informed observers 12 conclude that
they are not managed according to recognized international standards.
13
The dangerous waste generated by the reactors in Murmansk is stored or
disposed of under unsafe conditions in a manner that presents a danger
to human health and to the natural environment both on land and at sea.
The United States and Norway have discovered, at considerable finan-
cial cost, that retiring thirty-one submarines under START cannot be ac-
complished without addressing the larger issue of the Russian nuclear
fleet's pollution of the Arctic.
8. See discussion infra Part V.A. (discussing the Chernobyl accident).
9. See infra note 31 (discussing the Mayak Nuclear Materials complex).
10. See Yablokov Report, supra note 7.
11. See id. See also discussion infra Part II.C (for an in depth discussion of these
concerns).
12. One of the most prominent of these is the Bellona Foundation of Norway,
whose reports are cited throughout this paper. Bellona describes its mission thus:
"Bellona Foundation was founded as an independent ideal organization in 1986. The
Foundation is a science based environmental organization whose main objective is to
combat problems of environmental degradation, pollution-induced dangers to human
health and the ecological impacts of economic development strategies." Bellona, An In-
troduction to the Bellona Foundation (visited Feb. 17, 1999)
<http://www.bellona.org/e/bellona/index.htm>. Experts at Bellona possess detailed in-
formation about the Russian nuclear submarine crisis. For example, Alexander Nikitin
was a Russian Naval Submarine Commander and is a coauthor of the original Bellona
report. He is currently in jail in Russia for his part in Bellona. See Bellona, Nikitin Trial
(visited Mar. 10, 1999) <http://www.bellona.org/e/russia/ nikitin/overview.htm>.




The disarming and decommissioning of a nuclear submarine is a
major engineering task involving four steps that have significant envi-
ronmental impacts. 4 START addressed the first step concerning the dis-
arming of submarines, but not the other steps involving the destruction
of submarines; the treatment and disposal of nuclear wastes; and the dis-
posal of other radioactive materials. START negotiators remained igno-
rant throughout the treaty-making process of the extent of Soviet pollu-
tion of the Arctic and of the inability of the Russians who legally
succeeded the Soviet Union to cope, not only with the existing fleet of
retired submarines, but also with any further fleet reductions necessi-
tated by START SLBM provisions. START appears to leave unad-
dressed the environmental impacts of decommissioning thirty-one sub-
marines in short order. Apparently, treaty negotiators did not foresee that
the implementation of START might exacerbate existing Arctic nuclear
pollution.
A number of physical, topographical, and oceanographic features of
the Arctic Ocean give rise to deep concern about the dangers presented
by increasing nuclear pollution. First, the Arctic, unlike the Antarctic, is
almost completely surrounded by the continental land masses of Eurasia,
North America, and Greenland. It is virtually an estuary of the Atlantic
with very little circulation between itself and the Atlantic or Pacific
Ocean.' 5 Second, the Eurasian side of the Arctic Ocean, where radioac-
tive dumping and land-based pollution occur, consists of shallow waters
that lie over continental shelves ranging from 300 tol100 miles in
length. 16 Third, while the Arctic does contain deep basins, the shallow
waters in which the Soviet dumping took place are connected because
the Arctic contains a high ratio of freely connected shallow seas to deep
basins. Essentially, this means that pollution can become concentrated in
shallow waters, rendering dilution of such wastes impossible. Unfortu-
nately, much of the dumping of nuclear wastes and even whole reactors
has taken place in the shallow Barents and Kara Seas.
Because there is little circulation between the Arctic and Atlantic
Oceans, the Barents Sea, into which nuclear dumping occurred, tends to
concentrate and confine such pollution. At the same time, the Barents
14. See discussion infra Part III.A (describing specific environmental impacts re-
sulting from the decommissioning of nuclear submarines).
15. The major hydrological circulation into and out of the Arctic basin is through a
single deep channel-the Fram Strait-that lies between the islands of Spitsbergen and
Greenland. Small quantities of Pacific water also enter the Arctic through the Bering
Strait. See Arctic, 14 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITrANICA 4 (1997).
16. See id. An enormous submarine mountain range named the Lomonosov Ridge,
which has an average relief of 10,000 feet, divides the Arctic into the Eurasia basin on
the European side and the Amerasia basin on the American side. See id.
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Sea remains connected to the Fram Strait, the main source of outflow
into the Atlantic. According to climatologists, the outflow of water from
the Arctic to the Atlantic through the Fram Strait is a major factor in
regulating the large-scale circulation and mean temperature of the world,
with a potentially profound impact on global climate change.' 7 Arctic
waters, rendered more radioactive by the present patterns of pollution
have the potential for affecting radioactivity in the global oceans.
In addition, the Arctic is an important global ecosystem, part of the
marine food chain, and the feeding and breeding ground of many mi-
gratory fish, birds, and mammals. 18 The Arctic Ocean provides impor-
tant habitats for many migratory species such as the Canadian goose, the
killer whale, and the reindeer. The Arctic is also a nursery to many of
the world's animals, especially birds and fish. 19 These migratory species
have the capacity to carry radioactive contamination back to less con-
taminated lands, spreading the poison.20 Damage to the habitat of the
Arctic could result in serious ecological consequences.
A. Past Dumping
Russian dumping of approximately 2.4 million curies (Ci) 21 of ra-
dioactive material took place behind a veil of secrecy from 1958 to
17. See id.
18. See id. at 11-13.
19. See James Meek, Russians Take Plunge to Make Sunken Sub Safe, GUARDIAN
(London), June 8, 1995, at 14.
20. See Tom Dunkel, Eyeballing Eiders, AUDUBON, Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 48 (noting
a decline of sea mammals, increasing pollution, and natural resource pressures in the
Arctic).
21. A curie is an empirically derived unit that is used to measure the amount of
inherent radioactivity in a substance-the source of the radioactivity. Other relatively
common units for measuring radioactivity are rads (R) and rems (r). Each of these units
is related. Whereas the Ci measures the strength of a source of radioactivity, R and r
measure the absorption of the radioactivity as the absorption of energy. That is, 1 R=100
ergs of absorbed energy per gram of absorbing material. The rem, however, is a much
more complicated unit that relates to the absorption of radioactivity in human tissue. See
JOHN W. GOFMAN, RADIATION AND HUMAN HEALTH 46 (1981). For a fuller explication
see NATIONAL COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROTECTION AND MEASUREMENTS, THE RELATIVE
BIOLOGICAL EFFECTIVENESS OF RADIATIONS OF DIFFERENT QUALITY, NCRP Report No.
104 (1990). A large volume of radioactive waste was dumped in the Russian Arctic, most
of it contained in accidentally damaged reactors. While varying records were kept of the
volume and radioactivity of the dumped wastes, there is very little data for the reactors
that were dumped because they were involved in accidents. The extent of radioactivity in
the dumped reactors has been estimated, and the recent estimates are derived from infor-
mation about the fuel in the reactors and their operating histories. See Yablokov Report,
supra note 7. These estimates are admittedly not very accurate because each of the
[Vol. 10:2
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1992.22 According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
the former Soviet Union's radioactive waste-dumping practices were
first publicized by a Russian nongovernmental environmental group
named Towards a New Earth, in 1991.23
At the Fifteenth Consultative Meeting of the London Convention
on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, Greenpeace and the member states tasked the Russian govern-
ment to report on its radioactive waste-dumping practices. Russia had
previously stated that it had never dumped radioactive waste at sea, but
there were indications otherwise.24 The Yablokov Report-a stunning
example of an open response under glasnost-officially revealed the
dumping, triggering a number of news reports,25 articles,26 books,27 and
conferences 28 on the Russian disposal of radioactive waste.
More radioactive waste, including six or seven fully fueled nuclear
reactors, has been dumped by the former Soviet Union into the Arctic
Ocean than the totality of radioactive materials dumped into the rest of
the world's oceans.29 In fact, the Russians are responsible for dumping
dumped reactors was involved in an accident that could have changed the amount of ra-
dioactivity. See Sjoeblom & Linsley, infra note 23. The best estimates of total radioac-
tivity dumped in the Arctic range between 1 and 3 million Ci. Id.
22. See Yablokov Report, supra note 7, tbls. 2, 3, 8, 9.
23. See Kirsti-Liisa Sjoeblom & Gordon S. Linsley, The International Arctic Seas
Assessment Project: Progress Report (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http://
www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/inforesource/bulletin/bul1372/sjoeblom.html>.
24. See id.
25. See Yablokov Report, supra note 7. See also NATO, DECOMMISSIONED
SUBMARINES IN THE RUSSIAN NORTHWEST: ASSESSING AND ELIMINATING RISKS (1997).
26. See, e.g., Jennifer Mclver, Environmental Protection, Indigenous Rights and
the Arctic Council: Rock, Paper, Scissors on the Ice?, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 147
(1997); Steven D. Lavine, Russian Dumping in the Sea of Japan, 24 DENY. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 417 (1996); James R. McCullagh, Russian Dumping of Radioactive Wastes in the
Sea of Japan: An Opportunity to Evaluate the Effectiveness of the London Convention
1972, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 399 (1996); Kristin Moody-O'Grady, Nuclear Waste
Dumping in the Oceans: Has the Cold War Taught Us Anything?, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J.
695 (1995); Jason H. Eaton, Kicking the Habit: Russia's Addiction to Nuclear Waste
Dumping at Sea, 23 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 287 (1995).
27. See, e.g., MURRAY FESHBACH & ALFRED FRIENDLY JR., ECoCIDE IN THE USSR
(1992); MURRAY FESHBACH, ECOLOGICAL DISASTER: CLEANING UP THE HIDDEN LEGACY
OF THE SOVIET REGIME (1996).
28. See, e.g., WOODS HOLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INSTITUTION, RADIOACTIVITY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN THE OCEANS: NEW RESEARCH AND POLICY PRIORITIES IN
THE ARCTIC AND NORTH ATLANTIC (1993); NATO, ADVANCED RESEARCH WORKSHOP:
RECYCLING, REMEDIATION, AND RESTORATION STRATEGIES FOR CONTAMINATED CIVILIAN
AND MILITARY SITES IN THE ARCTIC FAR NORTH (1996).
29. See Yablokov Report supra note 7, tbls. 1-9.
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twice as much nuclear waste as rest of the combined nuclear powers of
the world. 30 The Arctic seas are also subject to radiation inputs from
many other sources, including runoff from the discharge of nuclear re-
processing wastes into rivers that flow into the Arctic seas; 31 atmos-
pheric, underwater, and underground atomic and hydrogen bomb testing
30. See id.
31. See John Glenn, The Mayak Nuclear Materials Production Complex and the
Techa River (visited Dec. 14, 1998) <http://news.poweronline.com/feature-
articles/19980721-340.html#john>. Nuclear material reprocessing and nuclear weapons
and fuel plants in the interior of Russia have dumped in excess of five million Ci of ra-
diation into rivers flowing into the Arctic seas. See id.
Near the southern Ural Mountains, in the Russian province of Chelyabinsk,
there is a Soviet nuclear facility called the Mayak Chemical Combine. From
1948 until 1990 when the last of five reactors was shut down, the Combine
contaminated the region to such an extent that it is now known as the most
polluted area on Earth. The region received this title due to the Combine's
continuous disregard for environmental and public safety. However, there are
three specific incidents that stand out: (1) intentional dumping of radioactive
waste into the Techa River; (2) an explosion at a radioactive waste storage fa-
cility in 1957; and (3) a 1967 wind storm that deposited irradiated sediments
from Lake Karachay onto the surrounding province. Id.
An estimated 150 million Ci of radioactivity was released into the environment
and may have been transported down the Techa and Ob Rivers and into the Kara Sea. See
id. Ocean models show that while the highest concentrations of radioactivity are con-
tained in the mouths of the rivers that flow from Siberia, measurable quantities of radioi-
sotopes also appear hundreds of miles out into the Kara Sea. See Transport of Radionu-
clides Kara Sea (visited Dec. 14, 1998) <http://www.nrsc.no/New/kara.html>.
[Vol. 10:2
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on Nova Zemlya; 32 and releases resulting from various emergencies, in-
cluding Chernobyl.33
The elements found in spent nuclear fuel are some of the most toxic
on earth. One of these, plutonium, results from the spontaneous radioac-
tive decay of enriched uranium fuel34 and is sometimes referred to as the
single most dangerous element to human health and the environment.
35
Cesium is also a common product of nuclear fuel.36 Chemically, cesium
moves uniformly throughout the human body. In the environment, ce-
sium binds strongly to soil and enters the food chain where it is taken up
by plants and passed on to higher organisms, including humans.3 7
The constantly changing nature of radioactive substances makes
them dangerous. For example, if a small amount of pure uranium is iso-
lated in a container, it will propagate into a wide variety of radioactive
substances within the same container. Radioactive substances are con-
stantly changing their chemical form. Uranium spontaneously emits
subatomic particles from its nucleus and turns itself into protactinium in
a process that is called "radioactive decay." Protactinium is radioactive,
32. See Jeffrey Canfield, Soviet and Russian Nuclear Waste Dumping in the Arctic
Marine Environment: Legal, Historical and Political Implications, 6 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REV. 353, 374 (1994). Nova Zemlya, or New Land, was one of the former USSR's
"proving grounds" for weapons of mass destruction (see Fig. 1). The other was in
Kazakhstan, which has declared a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. The largest
nuclear bomb test in the world was detonated there, having a yield of 150 megatons. In
all, there were eighty-seven atmospheric, forty-two underground, and three underwater
nuclear bomb tests. See id. The environmental result of this bomb testing is unknown,
controversial, and a Russian military secret. A study by a commission of the Russian
Ecology Ministry found low levels of gamma radiation, concluding that the average ra-
diation level for the island did not exceed normal background levels. However, a rela-
tively recent article by Jeffrey Canfield details an independent report to the Russian Su-
preme Soviet that found there were several areas of gamma radiation up to two
milliroentgens (mR) per hour, which could result in a yearly dose of 17.52 R per year-
100 to 175 times normal background levels. Background levels of radiation are normally
quite low, delivering between 100 and 300 mR, depending upon where a person lives
and works. See Natural Background Radiation (visited Dec. 12, 1998)
<http://www.triumf.ca/safety/tsn/tsn-6-2/section3_9.html>.
33. See discussion infra Part V.A (describing the effects of the Chernobyl acci-
dent).
34. See SAMUEL GLASSTONE & WALTER JORDAN, NUCLEAR POWER AND ITS
EFFECTS (1980).
35. See JOHN HARTE, Toxcs A TO Z: A GUIDE TO EVERYDAY POLLUTION HAZARDS
386 (1992).
36. See id. at 263.
37. See id.
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so it "decays" through a series of radioactive isotopes until the element
that was originally uranium becomes common lead.38
In the same way, spent nuclear fuel becomes more dangerous as it
ages, because more and more decay products are formed. A typical used
nuclear reactor core will contain many thousands of different radioactive
isotopes, even though it started with only a few. 39 Each new isotope has
its own chemistry, and each might be expected to behave differently in
the environment. For instance, Uranium 238 is a heavy metal, similar to
lead in appearance and form. However, each Uranium 238 isotope will
at one time or another turn into radon gas. We might expect uranium that
has been dumped into the ocean to be trapped in sediments, but the ra-
don could diffuse out of the sediments and into the water. Further, many
of the radioactive isotopes that form in the uranium decay series are
metals, which means they will form salts and oxides if they are exposed
to sea water. Salts dissolve easily in water, and can make the radioactive
materials freely mobile in the environment. The changing nature of ra-
dioactive substances makes their potential for environmental transport
enormous. Tracking or predicting this movement becomes incredibly
40complicated, and sometimes even impossible.
In a large ecological context like the Arctic Ocean, there are many
complex factors at work. Pollutants might become entrapped in the
sediments or ice, or they might be mobilized through the food chain. As
we have seen, the radioactive substances can spontaneously change form
and chemistry, increasing the probability that they will become part of
an ecological system.
Models have been developed that might help scientists approximate
the movement of radioactive materials in the environment, and, to a
limited extent, these models may become important tools for predicting
the effects of radioactive releases in the Arctic.4' However, recent stud-
ies42 of the radioactive pollution of the Arctic continue to be equivocal
as to future environmental impacts. The new studies echo the United
States Office of Technology Assessment in 1995 that concluded,
[e]stimates and approximations of future impacts [from Russian
38. See GLASSTONE & JORDAN, supra note 34, fn.34. Radioactive decay can take a
long time. For instance, the naturally occurring form of uranium, U238, has a 4.5 billion
year half life. That is, in 4.5 billion years, half of the U, that was first "created" in a
rock will have decayed into something else. See id.
39. See id.
40. See generally, Jason B. Aamodt, Note, Naturally Occurring Radioactive Mate-
rials: Human Health and Regulation, 33 TULSA L.J. 847 (1998).
41. See discussion infra Part IH.
42. See discussion infra Part Ill.
[Vol. 10:2
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dumping] based upon information available do not suggest a notice-
able effect on human health or on plant and animal populations.
However, many unknowns remain, from the status of the dumped
wastes, to the likely movement of radionuclides through the envi-
ronment, to the dietary intakes of those most likely to be exposed.43
Despite all the uncertainties, a great deal is known about the quan-
tities, and to some extent, the qualities of radioactive materials that the
Russians dumped into the Arctic seas. The dumping was mainly done in
three ways: (1) direct dumping of uncontained high-, medium-, and low-
level liquid radioactive waste; (2) direct dumping of thousands of tons of
solid, high-level radioactive waste in various forms of containment; and
(3) direct dumping of sixteen to eighteen nuclear submarine reactors-
six or seven with all of their fuel-reportedly after the submarines had
met with accidents of varying severity.44
1. Uncontained Liquid Radioactive Waste
Submarines produce liquid waste in two ways. First, contaminated
areas are often flushed with water to decontaminate them. This results in
generally low-level or less concentrated waste.45 Second, the coolant
systems in the submarine reactors are flushed when they become too
contaminated with radioactive materials to operate safely. This results in
46high-level or more highly concentrated radioactive waste. The
Yablokov Report indicates that, as of 1992, approximately 190,000 cu-
43. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NUCLEAR WASTES IN THE ARCTIC: AN
ANALYSIS OF ARCTIC AND OTHER REGIONAL IMPACTS FROM SOvIET NUCLEAR CON-
TAMINATION, 12-13, OTA-ENV-632 (1995).
44. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
45. See Yablokov Report, supra note 7, at 11-12.
46. See id. About 200 cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste is created with each
refueling - a process that takes place every 7-10 years. See Susanne Kopte, Nuclear
Submarine Decommissioning and Related Problems (visited Dec. 12, 1998)
<http://bicc.uni-bonn.de/weapons/paperl 2/content.html>.
The yearly production of liquid waste is between 2,000-2,500 m3. Since all
storage capacity on the Kola Peninsula is full, the situation has become acute.
Some liquid waste is processed at the Atomflot treatment plant in the Mur-
mansk fjord. In 1994 the Northern Fleet delivered 1,000 M3 here and in 1995,
200 m3. Even if the Atomflot treatment capacity should increase, the Northern
Fleet will have difficulty in footing the bill for treatment and transport.
Thomas Nilsen et al., The Russian Northern Fleet Radioactive Waste at the Naval Bases:
4.3.4. Andreeva Bay (visited Dec. 15, 1998) <http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/
nfl4.htm#O8>.
1999]
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bic meters of liquid radioactive waste, with a total activity of approxi-
47
mately 23,000 Ci, was dumped at five sites in the Arctic seas.
2. Dumped Solid Radioactive Waste
Solid radioactive wastes were generated by the Russian navy during
the refitting and maintenance of nuclear submarines. The Yablokov Re-
port indicates that 6508 containers of various sizes, quantities, and con-
centrations of radioactivity were dumped into numerous regions in the
Arctic Ocean.48 An earlier report of such nuclear dumping indicated that
few precautions were taken with many of the containers. Bullet holes
were shot into floating containers, and at least one highly radioactive
container floated ashore in Nova Zemlya.49 The amount of radioactivity
in these containers was summarily recorded by the Russian Fleet as they
were dumped into the Kara, White, and Barents Seas, totaling about
15,000 Ci.50 However, these measurements have been questioned,51 and
there are few details on the quality of radioactive sources that were con-
tained in the solid waste containers. The most recent data show that at
least some containers are still leaking, while the containment on others
has not yet been breached. 52 All of the containers were dumped between
1960 and 1980, and the Yablokov Report specifically indicates that the
metal containers only have a ten- to thirty-year life expectancy.53 Much
of the solid waste can be characterized as "high-level," or concentrated
waste. 4
47. See Yablokov Report supra note 7. Note that the entire radioactivity of
dumped waste is much larger. Liquid wastes are a subset of the many types of waste that
the former Soviet Union dumped. See id. tbl. A.2.
48. See id. tbl. A.4. One hundred and fifty-four items were dumped without con-
tainers, and there is no correlation between these items and the amount of radioactivity
they may contain. See id.
49. See Canfield, supra note 32.
50. See Yablokov Report, supra note 7, tbl. A.4.
51. See Canfield, supra note 32, quoting Vitaly A. Kimstach, Deputy Chairman of
the Russian Committee for Hydrometerology, in Stella Bugge, Russia Says 17 Nuclear
Reactors Dumped in Kara Sea, REUTER LIBR. REP., Feb. 5, 1993. The Yablokov Report
translates all activity readings into strontium 90 equivalents, which is a very odd proce-
dure and makes the exact determination of the amount of radiation difficult, or impossi-
ble. See id.
52. See IAEA, Waste Disposal in the Arctic Seas (visited Dec. 9, 1998)
<http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/inforesource/bulletin/bul1391/specialreport.html>
[hereinafter Waste Disposal]. "[E]levated levels of radionuclides were detected in sedi-
ments within a few meters of the low-level waste containers, suggesting that the contain-
ers have leaked." Id.
53. See Yablokov Report, supra note 7, at 17.
54. See id. at 15.
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The Yablokov Report further indicates that a total of eighteen sub-
marine and naval ship nuclear reactor cores were dumped, sixteen in the
Arctic seas (six fueled, one partially fueled) and two in the Sea of Ja-
55 56pan.55 An earlier report by a seemingly reliable source indicated that
seventeen nuclear reactors were dumped in the Arctic seas, seven with
their fuel.5 7 The IAEA-Russian-Norwegian testing missions were unable
to locate all of the dumped reactors.58
The Yablokov and other reports state that the reactors dumped with
fuel were each involved in a severe accident and had begun to
"meltdown. ' 59 Later IAEA reports60 indicate that the Russians encased
the reactors within steel and concrete, and injected each with Furfuro 61
to stabilize them before dumping. The Yablokov Report found that one
of the fully fueled reactors was not injected with Furfurol, and the report
does not say whether any of the reactors were encased in steel or con-
55. See id. at 10-16.
56. See Canfield, supra note 32, at 390.
57. See id.
58. See Sjoeblom & Linsley, supra note 23. "The cruises have succeeded in lo-
cating some of the dumped high level wastes and measurements have been made in situ
and also on samples taken in the vicinity of the dumped objects (submarines, reactor
compartments, waste containers)." Id.
59. See Yablokov Report, supra note 7, at 12. A "meltdown" refers to the uncon-
trolled heating of the reactor core such that it loses its physical and mechanical integ-
rity-the core actually melts. See id.
60. See Waste Disposal, supra note 52.
[I]n 1993, the IAEA launched the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project
(IASAP). Its main objectives were to assess the risks to human health and to
the environment associated with the radioactive wastes dumped in the Kara and
Barents Seas; and to examine possible remedial actions related to the dumped
wastes and to advise on whether they are necessary and justified. The study,
which involved more than 50 experts from 14 countries and was under the di-
rection of an International Advisory Group, concluded in late 1996. Partially
supported by extrabudgetary funding from the United States, the project was
coordinated with the work of the Norwegian-Russian Expert Group for Inves-
tigation of Radioactive Contamination in the Northern Areas. Id.
61. See Evaluation of Waste Packages Dumped in the Kara Sea (visited Dec. 12,
1998) <http://www.dne.bnl.gov/-heiser/kurchatv.htm>. Furfurol is an agent that is used
to stabilize spent nuclear fuel and will apparently encase a reactor and make it less sus-
ceptible to environmental degradation. See id. Its ability to suspend the reactors in the
Arctic seas is unknown and is being studied by British Nuclear Fuels. Furfurol is also an
environmental pollutant that "upon rapid inhalation, irritates eye and respiratory tract
mucous membranes. A chronic exposure may cause degenerative changes in kidneys,
liver and peripheral nervous system, as well as disturbances in digestion and metabo-
lism." World Health Organization, National Environmental Health Action Plans: Latvia
(visited Dec. 12, 1998) <http://www.who.dk/NEHAP/Lat/Lchap32.htm>.
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crete.62 A Russian designer of the submarine reactors estimates that the
Furfurol will keep sea water from the fuel "for hundreds of years (up to
500)." The IAEA reports estimate that a total release of radiation could
occur between fifty and 1000 years from now.
63
The amount of radiation in each dumped reactor has been estimated
from Russian records, and newer data indicates that each reactor con-
tained from 90,000 to 1.2 million Ci.64 However, the estimates are inac-
curate where the Russian data is incomplete 65 and where there is no ac-
count of the severity of the accident that led to the dumping of the
reactor.66 Although later IAEA and earlier Russian estimates differ, they
are in the same order of magnitude. 67 In all, the Yablokov Report esti-
mates 90 PBq (2.4 million Ci) of radiation in the dumped waste, and a
later IAEA revision states 37 PBq (1 million Ci). 68 What this means in
qualitative terms-according to Dr. Charles Hollister of the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution-is that there "is more radioactive material in
those seven reactors than in Chernobyl. ' 69
62. See Yablokov Report, supra note 7, at 12.
63. See Waste Disposal, supra note 52.
64. See Yablokov Report, supra note 7, at 12.
65. See Pavel Povinec et al., Marine Scientists on the Arctic Seas: Documenting
the Radiological Record (visited Dec. 13, 1998) <http://www.iaea.org/woridatom
/inforesource/bulletin/bu11372/povinec.html#reference> [hereinafter Documenting the
Radiological Record] (noting, among other things, that the estimates were revised, but
that the Russian-supplied data upon which the revisions were made were incomplete).
66. See Sjoeblom & Linsley, supra note 23.
67. See IAEA, Data on the Nuclear Reactors Dumped near Novaya Zemlya
(visited Dec. 10, 1998) <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/inforesource/buletin/bu1372/
dumptable.html>. Both the IAEA and the Russian studies estimate that there have been
tens of PBqs of radioactive material released from the Russian submarines. See id.
68. See id. For a conversion of PBqs to Cis, see Radiation Measurement (visited
Dec. 9, 1998) <http://www.physics.isu.edu/radinf/measure.htm>. In summary, 1 Bq is
equal to one nuclear disintegration per second; I Ci = 3.7 X 10'0 Bq. (P = Peta, which is
the International unit for 10", or 1,000,000,000,000,000). See also SI Unit Prefixes
(visited Dec. 9, 1998) <http://www-personal.umich.edu/-rcnh/gs 102/ SIprefixes.html>.
69. See Canfield, supra note 32, at 396, citing Anne Mcllroy, Soviet Navy Dumped
Seven Plutonium Reactors in Shallow Waters; Coldwar Hangover Haunts Arctic,
TORONTO STAR, Dec. 12, 1992, at D6. See also OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Cherno-
byl Ten Years on (visited Dec. 14, 1998)




B. Nuclear Submarine Accidents"°
Every sector of the Russian nuclear program has been plagued with
accidents and consequent releases of radiation into the environment. 7' At
no time in its history has this already burdened system ever been more
susceptible to serious accidents than the present.7 For example, in 1997
a reportedly defueled Russian submarine sank at its moorings while
awaiting further decommissioning.73
In a separate incident, a Delta Class submarine burned not far out to
sea on May 6, 1998. Police were ordered to issue iodine tablets to the
population of Murmansk to ward off the effects of the expected radiation
fallout. Order was restored on May 7 when the Russian Navy announced
that the entire episode was only an exercise.
7 4
On August 10, 1985, at yet another Soviet naval base-Chazhma
Bay near Vladivostok-a nuclear submarine had just been refueled when
a leaking gasket was discovered. While repairing the reactor, a torpedo
boat swept by the floating repair station, causing the fuel rods to be
jerked out of the reactor. 75 The reactor exploded. The twelve-ton lid over
the reactor was blown off and the cover of the refueling station landed
100 feet away. Radioactive materials were spread across the peninsula;
according to some accounts, the wind was blowing towards Vladivos-
tok.76 It has been estimated that the total radioactivity released was about
70. US Navy submarines have experienced 29 accidents since 1915, while the
Russian Navy has experienced 24. See Soviet Peacetime Submarine Losses, (visited Dec.
15, 1998) <http://freeweb.pdq.net/GStitz/Soviet.htm>; U.S. Peacetime Submarine Losses
(visited Dec. 15, 1998) <http://freeweb.pdq.net/gstitz/peaceloss.htm>.
71. See Thomas Nilsen et al., The Russian Northern Fleet Introduction (visited
Dec. 18, 1998) <http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/nflO-2.htm>. See generally
FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 27 (accident background).
72. See Nilsen et al., The Russian Northern Fleet Introduction, supra note 71.
73. See David Filipov, Armed and Dangerous: Russia's Nuclear Fleet in Serious
Disrepair, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 22, 1998, at Al.
74. See id. Local residents and environmental groups believe that the "exercise
story" was a cover up and that a fire actually occurred. They point to the fact that western
military data show that the sub unexpectedly surfaced on May 6, and that no Northern
Fleet subs were sent on patrol for three months following the exercise. See id. See also
Rupert Cornwell, The Most Dangerous Place on the Planet, INDEPENDENT (London),
Oct. 20, 1998, at 15; Thomas Nilsen, Delta-I Incident in May Not an Exercise: No Rus-
sian Subs Patrol for Three Months (visited Dec. 15, 1998)
<http:/www.bellona.no/e/russialnfl/news/ 980917.htm>.
75. The details of the Chazhma Bay accident were first released in the Yablokov
Report. See Yablokov Report, supra note 7, at 21.
76. See id. at 21-22. See also Evginiy Sholkoh, One More Submarine Story: Nu-
clear Crash (visited Dec. 15, 1998) <http://vladivostok.com/rus-mag/eng/N_2/
1CHAZHMA.HTM> (for a uniquely personal account of the tragedy).
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one-seventh of that released by Chernobyl.7 Portions of the surrounding
seabed are even now highly contaminated. This accident was covered up
by the Russian Navy for seven years.78 On January 20, 1998, the workers
who were exposed to radiation while cleaning up the explosion were fi-
nally accorded the same status as the Chernobyl workers.79
The Chazhma Bay accident may not have been an unusual occur-
rence. As previously noted, the Yablokov Report indicates that six re-
actors were dumped into the Arctic Sea because they had begun to melt-
down.80 The Chazhma submarine and five others remain in Russian ports
after accidents that have damaged their fuel, making their removal im-
possible. 1
C. Future Concerns
Beyond the past dumping, there are two major causes for future
concern: first, the disposal of existing stockpiles of waste; and second,
disposal of waste that will be generated by submarines to be retired. Ex-
isting stockpiles present a bleak and daunting picture. To begin with, the
ports of the Northern and Pacific Fleet have become the de facto re-
positories of huge volumes of highly radioactive materials.8 2 For the
most part, these materials remain in place in the shipyards, either in dry
storage, in service ships, in pools and holding tanks, or in submarines
that are to be decommissioned. Current data list these items in volumes
(cubic meters) and numbers of fuel assemblies.8 3
A comparison of the past dumping to the volume of radioactivity
that has yet to be disposed of frames a dystopian "big picture." A reactor
similar to the types that were dumped contains approximately 280 fuel
77. See Accident at Chazhma Bay (visited Dec. 15, 1998) <http://
ds.dial.pipex.com/cndscot/trisaf/ch4.htm#Chazhma Bay> [hereinafter Chazhma Bay].
78. See David Hoffman, Reactor Blast Shows Danger of Aging Subs, WASH. POST,
Nov. 16, 1998, at A22. See also Agency For Social Information Bulletin, Russian Green
Cross Concludes Research on Radiation and Chemical Contamination (visited Dec. 15,
1998) <http://solar.cini.utk.edu/-ccsi/asi/1997/50-159.htm>; Chazhma Bay, supra note
77.
79. See Nuke Workers Win Belated Victory (visited Dec. 15, 1998)
<http://vn.vladnews.ru/l1998/iss159/text/best.htm>.
80. See Yablakov Report, supra note 7, at 12.
81. See Kopte, supra note 46.
82. See Yablokov Report, supra note 7, at 25-29.
83. For anything other than the rough and qualitative purpose to which the radio-
activity concentrations are estimated here, the estimation of the radioactivity concentra-
tion is fruitless because it is constantly changing as the material decays.
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assemblies.8 4 Therefore, by extrapolation, there were about 1680 fuel as-
semblies dumped into the Arctic seas. In contrast, 30,000-plus fuel as-
semblies await final disposition; over 20,000 in the Northern Fleet naval
bases and more than 10,000 in the Pacific naval bases. An estimated
30,000 more fuel assemblies have yet to be removed from the fifty-two
inactive submarines that are derelict in the ports of the Northern Fleet
naval bases. However, all reports indicate that there is little or no storage
space left in the shipyards for any more spent nuclear fuel. To make
matters worse, an additional fifty-five more nuclear submarines are
slated to be taken out of active service and then decommissioned by
2010.85
Future problems are staggering when compared to the past. To date,
36,000 Ci of radioactive materials have entered the marine environment
from dumping. Another one to three million Ci were dumped but are
thought to be contained at this time. Comparatively, 35 to 107 million Ci
of spent nuclear fuel have yet to be dealt with and are contained, to
varying degrees, throughout the Russian submarine complex.8 6 Millions
more curies of solid and liquid radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel
will be generated in the decommissioning of the waiting submarines.
Simple arithmetic shows that the yet to be addressed spent nuclear fuel
and nuclear waste is approximately 2300 to 7000 times greater than that
which has so far been released into the environment, and is 10 to 100
times greater than the potential harm that may be caused by the dumped
reactors that have not yet leaked into the environment.
Approximately 200 of Russia's 240 submarines are slated to be de-
commissioned and scrapped by 2010. The former Soviet Union began
this process to reduce the economic burden of maintaining such an ex-
tensive and aging fleet. Then, in 1991, the former Soviet Union agreed
under START to eliminate 4166 nuclear warheads by 2005, some of
87which were housed on thirty-one ballistic nuclear submarines.
The START treaty plays an important role in the decommissioning
of the Russian nuclear submarines.8 8 START negotiations between the
84. See Kopte, supra note 46, at 31.
85. See id.
86. See id. This estimate is based upon simple calculations from existing data that
one to three million curies represent the total radioactivity of the six dumped reactors,
and that the 60,000 remaining fuel assemblies represent 214 additional reactors (280 fuel
assemblies per reactor). See id.
87. See United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Start Treaty:
Achievement of Phase I Reductions (visited Dec. 18, 1998) <http://www.acda.gov/
factshee/wmd/nuclear/start l/achieve.htm> [hereinafter Phase I].
88. Even though START has been successful, START II appears to be in abey-
ance. Although START II would have required the further reduction of nuclear warheads
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United States and the Soviet Union began in 1982,89 and ended with the
signature of both nations in Moscow on July 31, 1991. 90 A few months
later, the Soviet Union dissolved into a number of independent states,91
with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine each in control of some
portion of the former Soviet Union's strategic nuclear weapons. The
Lisbon Protocol, signed on May 23, 1992, made these new states parties
to START.92 The Lisbon Protocol also committed Belarus, Kazakhstan,
and Ukraine to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-
nuclear weapon states, 93 and to eliminate all nuclear weapons and strate-
gic offensive arms from their territories.94
START reduces the strategic offensive weapons in the US and Rus-
sian arsenals as follows. 95 Each state must eliminate all nuclear weapons
except 6000 accountable warheads, 4900 ballistic missile warheads,
1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy
ICBMs, and 1100 warheads on mobile ICBMs. In all, this means that
each side will reduce its arsenals by about thirty to forty percent-more
96than 9000 warheads will be eliminated under the treaty.
START has a fifteen-year duration and can be extended for succes-
sive five-year periods by agreement among the parties.97 The reductions
under START are to take place in three stages.98 The first stage has
ended, and was fully implemented by both sides before December 5,
1997. Additionally, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have already met
and of nuclear submarines, the Russian Duma removed the ratification of START I from
its agenda when the United States began its most recent bombing mission in Iraq in De-
cember 1998. There have been discussions of a START 111, and of the setting of other
arms reduction goals, but these plans now appear to be unsettled.
89. See United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, START: Basic
Provisions of the Treaty (last modified May 21, 1996) <http://www.acda.gov/
factshee/wmd/nuclear/startl/strtbasi.htm>.
90. See START supra note 4.
91. See Elizabeth Rubertin, The Soviet Union Crumbles: Gorbachev Goes
Through Motions as Leader While the Nation He Led Hurries to Regroup, WALL ST. J.
EUR., Dec. 20, 1991, at 2.
92. Protocol to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, May 23, 1992, U.S.-Russia, Ukraine-Belarus-Kazakhstan, S. Treaty Doc. No. 32,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter Lisbon Protocol], available in
<http://www.acda.gov/treaties/start/lisbon.htm>.
93. See id. art. V.
94. See id.
95. See START, supra note 4, art. 2.
96. See Phase I, supra note 87.
97. See START, supra note 4, art. XVII.
98. See id. art. H.
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their requirements under the Lisbon Protocol.99 Stage two will end in
1999, and stage three will be completed in 2001. 00
While reductions under START are impressive, these successes
have opened up new avenues for the further reductions of nuclear weap-
ons. START II was signed on January 3, 1993, by Presidents George
Bush and Boris Yeltsin.' 0 ' It codifies a Joint Understanding signed on
February 3, 1992.102 The US Senate gave its advice and consent to the
treaty on January 26, 1996.103 Ratification of the treaty in the Russian
Duma has been pending since 1996, but activities of the United States in
99. See United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, START I: Lisbon
Protocol and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (visited Feb. 25, 1999)
<http://www.acda.gov/factshee/wmd/nuclearlstartl/npt-95.htm>.
100. See START, supra note 4. START negotiators concentrated on "effective
verification" that uses "National Technical Means" (NTM) and has mutually-reinforcing
verification provisions consisting of data exchanges, exchanges of telemetry data from
missile flight tests, a ban on the encryption of telemetry data, 12 types of on-site inspec-
tions and exhibitions, and a method for continuous monitoring at mobile ICBM plants.
See id.
START has grown to meet the needs of the signatories through the work of the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), which was established to oversee
START implementation. The JCIC held ten sessions between START's signature and its
entry into force and has since completed numerous agreements and joint statements.
These addenda to START focus on three major issues: (1) adapting START to a multi-
lateral context; (2) developing detailed procedures for implementation activities; and (3)
resolving questions about initial data exchanges. See id.
101. Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
Jan. 3, 1993, U.S.-Russian Federation, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-1 (1993) [hereinafter
START II].
102. Nuclear Weapons Reduction Act, Pub.L. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2315, § 1321
(1992). "On February 1, 1992, the President of the United States and the President of the
Russian Federation agreed in a Joint Statement that 'Russia and the United States do not
regard each other as potential adversaries,' " and stated further that, "We will work to
remove any remnants of cold war hostility, including taking steps to reduce our strategic
arsenals." Id. See also Demilitarization of Independent States of Former Soviet Union,
22 U.S.C. § 5901 (Supp. 1998).
103. See START II, supra note 101. If START II is implemented, it will totally
eliminate heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles and most other multiple-warhead
ICBMs. Additionally, it will further reduce the total number of strategic nuclear weapons
deployed by both countries. During the first phase of START II each side will reduce its
total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 3800 and 4250. During the final
phase, each side will further reduce its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to be-
tween 3000 and 3500. Most relevant to the future of places and problems described in
this article, no more than 1700 to 1750 deployed warheads may be on submarine
launched ballistic missiles, and these missiles may have multiple warheads. See id.
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Iraq'0 4 and Russia's recent deal to sell nuclear power plants to Iran'0°
could unsettle the situation.
Even though START promises to help reduce the terror of nuclear
weapons, other hard realities impede Russia's ability to manage her nu-
clear fleet, the most difficult of which are economic. With the breakup
of the Soviet Union, the expense of maintaining this large nuclear fleet
fell to Russia. Because of the huge expenses involved, and because
many of the non-SSBN submarines are becoming old and reaching the
end of their useful lives, Russia plans to scrap approximately 150 addi-
tional non-START submarines independently.10 6 The defueling of ap-
proximately ten non-START submarines took place between 1988 and
1995.107 The slow pace of defueling the derelict submarines is attribut-
able to the parallel need for the same equipment in the refueling of ac-
tive submarines. The Russian Navy has prioritized the refueling of the
active ships.108 Further complicating the issue is the fact that Russian
funding for defueling is scarce to nonexistent. In 1996, only fourteen
percent of the funds budgeted for submarine decomissionings were actu-
ally transferred to the shipyards for that purpose. °9 Russian plans were
developed to pay for the scrapping of the submarines by selling salvaged
scrap metal on international markets. 10 This plan has not worked, as the
cost of decommissioning submarines far exceeds the value of the scrap
metal sold.?"
Reports of incidents related to widespread underfunding continued
in 1998,12 much like the disruption of the electric power supply to the
Gadzhievo shipyard in 1995, which compromised the safety of a number
104. See Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Attacks Targets Just Outside Baghdad,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 25, 1999, at A4.
105. See Igor Kudrik, Russia Boosts Iranian Nuclear Facility Despite Interna-
tional Criticism (visited Feb. 25, 1999) <http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/990216.htm>.
106. It should be noted that the end of the cold war has led the other nuclear su-
perpowers of the world to reduce their submarine fleets. The United States plans to de-
commission 100 submarines by 2000, and 42 of them have been dismantled already. See
infra note 115.
107. See Thomas Nilsen et al., The Russian Northern Fleet: Decommissioning of
Nuclear Submarines (visited Dec. 18, 1998) <http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/
nfl6.htm>.
108. See id.
109. See Russian Parliament to Adopt Another Resolution: Short Funds Slow
Russian Submarine Decommissioning (visited Dec. 18, 1998) <http:l/www.bellona.no/e/
russia/nfl/news/060397.htm>.
110. See Economic Aspects (visited Dec. 18, 1998) <http://www.bellona.no/e/
russia/nfl/nfl6.htm#04>.
111. See id.
112. See Kudrik, supra note 105.
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of nuclear reactors in derelict ships. 1 3 Some data are available concern-
ing the extent of the problem at the Northern Fleet bases. The following
table from the Bellona website shows their findings concerning inactive
nuclear submarines and the volume of liquid and solid radioactive waste
at the Russian Naval bases. Bellona concluded in 1996 that these sites
were in such bad shape as to constitute an immediate safety risk, and by
all accounts these sources of contamination remain.
113. See Thomas Nilsen et al., Economic Conditions (visited Dec. 18, 1998)
<http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/nfl 1.htm#04>.
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Naval base Active Inactive Stored fuel Inactive Liquid Solid
Nuclear Submarines assemblies submarines Radioactive Radioactive
Ships w/fuel without fuel waste waste
Zapadnaya Litsa Shipyard
Bolshaya 22 1- 1 Yes Yes
Lopatka
Nerpichya 6 - Yes Yes
Andreeva - Max. 2,000 m3  Min. 6,000 m3
Bay 23,260
Vidyaevo 4 14 - - Min. 3 m3  Yes
Gadzhievo Shipyard
Sayda Bay - - 12 -
Gadzjievo 7 6 - 200 m3  2,037 m3
Olenya 12 - - -
Severomorsk 2 - - - -
Gremikha Yes 15 795 2,000 m3  300 m3
+9 reactor
cores
Table 1: Nuclear Safety Risks at Northern Fleet Naval Bases." 
4
The disarming and decommissioning of submarines creates adverse
environmental impacts. These impacts relate primarily to the disposal of
nuclear waste and the dangers posed by radioactivity involved in the
four stages of disarming and decommissioning nuclear weapons, subma-
rines, and reactors. While all nations agree that the first step involves the
removal of the missiles containing the warheads and the launching sys-
tems in which they are housed, different countries sometimes undertake
114. Table 6: The Objects at the Northern Fleet Bases that Represent a Nuclear
Safety Risk (visited Dec. 15, 1998) <http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/tab6pre.htm>.
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the three other steps in different order." 5 The former Supreme Soviet set
the following guidelines for submarine dismantling:
(1) Weapons and other important equipment to be removed; ves-
sels to be laid up with reduced crew in suitable locations at
Navy yards;
(2) Fuel elements to be removed from the reactor;
(3) Decommissioning of vessel by cutting out the reactor com-
partment; non-contaminated metal to be reused;
115. The manner through which the world's nuclear superpowers are reducing
their submarine fleets is instructive. The US program for submarine decommissioning
was developed in the 1980s. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DRAFT ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE DISPOSAL OF DECOMMISSIONED, DEFUELED NAVAL
SUBMARINE REACTOR PLANTS (1982), reprinted in NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT AND THE USE OF THE SEA, A
SPECIAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 68 (1984). The Navy has pro-
ceeded with a fully funded program of inactivation, dismantling, and storage. Id. In all,
the United States built 179 nuclear submarines since 1955. Between 1986 and 1992, 31
were dismantled using the procedure described below. By 2000, 100 are scheduled to
have been dismantled. See Dismantling Nuclear Submarines, (visited Dec. 9, 1998)
<http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/nuccost/ subs.htm>.
All US submarines are decommissioned at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in
Washington state. There, they are drydocked, defueled, and the reactor section and any
classified instruments are removed. Much of the material in the ships, including lead,
copper, and steel is scrapped for recycling. The spent nuclear fuel is sent to the Hanford
reservation for storage. The reactor cores are sealed at either end, loaded onto barges and
moved to the mouth of the Columbia River, where they are taken to Trench 94 at Han-
ford by special trailers that can carry the very heavy objects. See id.
France has successfully decommissioned two of its twelve nuclear submarines. See
Kopte, supra note 46. The French procedure is much the same as the US procedure, ex-
cept for the inclusion of an interim procedure whereby the reactors are put into dry stor-
age at Cherbourg for 15 to 20 years, after which the radioactivity should have diminished
enough to allow further dismantling. The French long-term storage site cannot accept as
large a parcel as a whole reactor compartment, so they must be cut into smaller pieces.
The French also store the spent fuel on an interim basis before final disposal to allow the
radioactivity to diminish before reprocessing or disposal. See id.
In England, by contrast, decommissioning procedures remain weak. Eleven of
England's 24 nuclear submarines are out of active service, and are awaiting disposition at
the naval docks in Devonport and Rosyth. All of the spent nuclear fuel has reportedly
been removed from the 11 reactors. The British plans for submarine disposal may have
been delayed because until the late 1980s the Navy recommended sinking them in the
deep Atlantic Ocean as the best and safest means of disposal. No disposal site currently
exists in England, but there are plans to dispose of them in deep storage at Sellafield be-
ginning in 2012. See id.
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(4) Sealing and transporting the reactor compartments to suitable
locations for long-term storage; storage to be undertaken
where radiation safety is maintained and can be verified. 16
These guidelines, however, have never been followed, and no ade-
quate facilities exist for doing so at this time. The reactors from those
submarines that were dismantled either were dumped in the ocean, or are
floating in isolated bays around the Kola Peninsula. 17 The spent fuel
and other wastes are spread throughout the naval complex. At least
eighty inactive nuclear submarines that are to be decommissioned re-
main in various Russian naval ports, most with their full load of nuclear
fuel. The Bellona Organization has compiled data on seventy of these
submarines, showing that fifty-two of these are fully fueled (see Table
2).
Z
.L r Ura OSayda lenya sout Gremikha Severodvinsk
w/o w/o wo w/o w/o w/o w/ w/o w/
Project 627 A - - 0/1 - 3/0 - 4/0
November
Project 658 - - 0/2 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0
Hotel
Project 659 - 5/0 6/0 0/2 1/0 1/0
Bcho-II
Project 661 - - - - 1/0
Papa
Project 667 A - - - 1/2 - - 10/5
Yankee
Project 667 B - - 1/0
Delta
Table 2. Summary of Locations of Laid-Up Nuclear Submarines,
Including Number of Defueled Vessels (stating the number of
submarines with and without fuel, respectively) (continued on next
page).
116. See Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Supreme Soviet, De-
cree No. 095-296 (1988).
117. See generally Yablokov Report, supra note 7.
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Table 2. Summary of Locations
(continued from previous page).
of Laid-Up Nuclear Submarines
There is no single method by which the Russian submarines are
being dismantled. Those that are not being handled pursuant to the
START agreement may not be decommissioned in any systematic fash-
ion at all. There are neither adequate facilities nor funds for removing
the fuel and storing it, for scrapping the submarines, or for paying for
labor to complete these tasks.
1 8
III. ASSESSING THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS
A. The Present Environmental Quality of the Arctic Ocean
It appears that the containment systems on the dumped nuclear re-
actors have not yet leaked."l 9 Recent studies of the radioactivity near the
reactors by the IAEA indicate that excessive concentrations of radiation
are not evident in the seas surrounding the reactors. 120 Experts believe
that it is unlikely that any one of the dumped reactors could again "go
critical" and experience a "meltdown" in the same manner as at Cherno-
byl. 121 Nonetheless, the dumped reactors remain a potential threat of ra-
118. See Economic Aspects, supra note 110.
119. See JAMES M. BROADUS & RAPHAEL V. VARTANOV, THE OCEANS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURTY: SHARED US AND RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES 146 (1994).
120. See Sjoeblom & Linsley, supra note 23.
121. Interview with Daniel Curran, Policy Fellow at the Wood's Hole Oceano-
graphic Institution (Dec. 9, 1998).
Z. Litsa Ara Ura Sayda Olenya Shkval Sevmorput Gremikha Severodvinsk
w/o w/o w/o w/o w/o w/o w/o w/o w/o
Project 670 - 1/0 1/0 - 0/1 - -
Charlie-II
Project 671 - - - - 0/1 3/0 - 8/0 -
Victor I
Project 705 1/1 - - 0/1 - - - 1/2
lfa IIII
Total: 1 111601 701 18 3/21 801 1/0 1 13/01 12/7
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diation pollution because they are subject to corrosion, and may even be
scoured by ice floes.
122
The depth and location of the dumped reactors makes them all the
more dangerous. IAEA guidelines on the proper ocean disposal of me-
dium- and low-level radioactive waste require that such wastes are
dumped into open oceans that are 4000 meters in depth. Dumping is to
take place in locations between fifty degrees north and fifty degrees
south, and shall not take place in semi-enclosed areas.1 23 Many of the
Russian reactors have been dumped in only twenty meters of water.
Contrary to IAEA guidelines, all of the dumpings took place above fifty
degrees north, and in the semi-enclosed Barents and Kara Seas.
124
The IAEA has studied the naval nuclear waste dumping in the Arc-
tic seas under a program it calls the International Arctic Seas Assess-
ment Project (IASAP). In response to prompting from the Fifteenth Con-
sultative Meeting of the London Convention, the IASAP assessed the
risks to human health and to the environment associated with dumped
nuclear wastes in the Arctic seas, and examined possible remedial ac-
tions. Its report, issued in 1997, found that, although radioactive waste
could be detected in the sea water surrounding the dump sites, the radio-
activity had dispersed only minimally. The IASAP did conclude, how-
ever, that the largest portion of the radioactivity had not yet breached its
containment, and that future monitoring would be necessary to catch
potential breaches.
125
Recent Russian and IAEA reports note that the radioactive releases
to date have not had effects beyond the local dumping areas. 126 A study
by the IAEA's Marine Environment Laboratory suggests that radioac-
tive materials escaping containment from one of the dumped reactors in
the Kara Sea should have only regional effects. 27 Even so, in 1995 Gor-
don Linsley, the then-acting head of the IAEA's Waste Safety Section,
noted, "[though] it has been concluded that [the dumped wastes] pose no
122. See Gordon Linsley, Environmental Impact of Radioactive Releases: Ad-
dressing Global Issues (visited Dec. 14, 1998) <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom
/inforesource/bulletin/buIl381/linsley.html>; Waste Disposal, supra note 52; Canfield,
supra note 32; Kirsti-Liisa Sjoeblom & Gordon S. Linsley, The International Arctic Seas
Assessment Project: Progress Report (visited Dec. 13, 1998) <http://www.iaea.org/
worldatom/inforesource/bulletinlbul1372/sjoeblom.html>.
123. See BROADUS & VARTANOV, supra note 119, at 136; Yablokov Report, supra
note 7, at 2.
124. See Yablokov Report, supra note 7, at 2.
125. See Waste Disposal, supra note 52.





threat to health or to the environment at the present time.., there re-
mains concern about the possible hazards which might result from leak-
age of radionuclides from the wastes at some future time."'
' 28
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European
Union have studied the Arctic nuclear waste problem in much the same
manner as the IASAP. In 1996, NATO's Committee on the Challenges
of Modern Society expanded its activities with the North Atlantic Coop-
eration Council (NACC) to include a study and recommendations, inter
alia, of the environmental effects of ending the cold war. In their five
volume report on the effects of dismantling nuclear military ships in the
Arctic, the NACC concluded that there was no widespread contamina-
tion. However, in light of the volumes of radioactive waste dumped into
the Arctic, they recommended that future monitoring be conducted to
identify any problems that might arise.
Apart from the strictly chemical analyses relied upon by these
studies, biological indicators reveal more widespread environmental
damage. Some populations of indigenous Arctic peoples, the Chucki for
instance, have recently experienced cancer mortality rates that are two to
ten times greater than the world average. 129 Millions of sea animals re-
cently died en masse in the White Sea. 130 While the exact cause of these
problems is unknown, reports indicate that the seals and other mammals
died of blood cancers. 131 Specifically, the Laboratory for the Protection
of Marine Animals at the Northern Polar Institute suggested that the
seals had been exposed to radioactivity. 132
B. The Paucity of Russian Waste Treatment Facilities
Any coordinated plan for the proper treatment and disposal of the
wastes from the Russian Navy has thus far been thwarted by inadequate
facilities, insufficient storage space, 133 accidents,134 and the clandestine
128. Linsley, supra note 122.
129. See BROADUS & VARTANOV, supra note 119, at 165.
130. See Canfield, supra note 32, at 412, citing BBC Summary of World Broad-
casts, Other Reports: Seals Dying of Cancer from Radioactive Waste in Russian Seas,
Apr. 10, 1992, SU/W0225/A/1 (summarizing broadcast by ITAR-Tass, World Service in
English, 0656 GMT, April 3, 1992).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Thomas Nilsen et. al., The Russian Northern Fleet Radioactive Waste at
the Naval Bases (visited Dec. 18, 1998)<http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/ nfl/nfl4.htm>.
134. See Russia Incidents (visited Dec. 18, 1998) <http://www.bellona.no/e
/russia/incidents.htm>.
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dumping of wastes in the Arctic and the Sea of Japan.135 There is cur-
rently no coherent policy for dealing with these wastes. Instead, only in-
complete programs and plans with no funding and poor maintenance
exist.
Various Russian agencies have developed different plans of action,
ranging from storage at sea to storage in caves that were built to hide the
Russian submarines to disposal on the New Land test sites. None of
these is currently being pursued. Instead, the waste continues to accu-
mulate in Russian ports, much of it left in the reactors of aging subma-
rines that have surpassed their usefulness. Many of the containment
structures and plans that do exist are totally inadequate. 136 The following
135. See generally Yablokov Report, supra note 7.
136. Both solid and liquid radioactive wastes were dumped into the Arctic and
Japan Seas because the former Soviet Union did not have adequate waste repositories.
Although none yet exist, a liquid waste reprocessing facility is being built in Murmansk
pursuant to a trilateral Russian, Norwegian, and US agreement. See Declaration Among
the Royal Ministry of Defense of the Kingdom of Norway, the Ministry of Defense of
the Russian Federation, and the Department of Defense of the United States of America
on Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 26, 1996 (on file with authors). A
second facility is being built in the Pacific Shipyard of Zevezda, with the help of Japan
and the United States. See Kopte, supra note 46. The commissioning of both of these
facilities has been delayed several times. See Igor Kudrik, Russian-Norwegian
Commission on Radwaste Holds First Meeting in Moscow (visited Dec. 15, 1998)
<http://www.bellona.no/elrussia/nfl/news/980731.htm>. Should these efforts fail, the
potential remains for future dumping since liquid wastes continue to be created through
the normal servicing of the Russian Fleet and the decommissioning of the nuclear
submarines. See Yablovok Report, supra note 7, at 11. A recent paper by the
Brookhaven National Laboratories details a design for the upgrade of a low-level liquid
radioactive waste treatment facility in Murmansk. See U.S. snd Russian Innovations to
Process Low-Level Radioactive Liquid Wastes, INDUS. HEALTH HAZARDS UPDATE, Oct. 1,
1998, available in 1998 WL 2071680.
A new floating factory for purifying liquid radioactive waste from nuclear
submarines could help solve Russia's problem with the increasing accumula-
tion of such wastes in the Far Eastern territories.
Tests have begun on the Landysh (Mayflower) floating factory in the town of
Bolshoi Kamen in Russia's Maritime Territory. This factory, built with the
help of U.S. money, will be tested in two stages, according to Russia's Pacific
Fleet headquarters. A Russian-US expert commission will assess the factory's
performance in the tests.
If the commission approves full operations, the first special tanker containing
liquid radioactive waste will be moored alongside Landysh. The factory ship
will remove all radioactive and toxic elements from the waste, returning only
purified water to the sea.
Russia currently has some 15,000 metric tons of liquid waste stored in tankers
and shore tanks.
Judith Perera, Russia: Floating Factory Could Ease Waste Buildup in Russia's Far East,
18 NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS (Nov. 5, 1998).
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excerpt from a Russian report of the condition of the storage in the Pa-
cific Fleet foretells a catastrophic future:
In facilities capable of producing a catastrophe on the scale of Cher-
nobyl there is no coastal technical backup of security; there is no
system of low- or high- pressure air for draining the compartments
[of derelict subs laid-up in Vladimir Bay], no bilge pumps or com-
pressors; the technical condition of the outer hull and the outboard
systems is unsatisfactory, the main ballast cisterns are leaky .... Put
more simply, the necessary temperature here is maintained by ordi-
nary, everyday domestic heaters which firemen do not allow to be
placed even in youth hostels .... There is no light in the majority of
compartments .... All the submarines' auxiliary equipment, which
might have been able to localize a potential fire, is out of order. The
crew does not even have mooring ropes to secure the submarines in
the event of a storm.
137
Accounts of the problems in the Northern Fleet are just as ominous,
if a bit less specific. Bellona reports that dismantled submarine com-
partments stored in sheltered bays have floated loose of their moorings.
Spent nuclear fuel is sitting in casks open to the atmosphere, in contain-
ers that have long ago been breached.
13 8
The naval bases and the waste contained in them present more
cause for concern. 139 Electricity was twice shut off to the largest subma-
rine naval base on the Kola Peninsula in 1995.140 The waste handling fa-
cilities at the submarine bases on the Kola Peninsula and near Vladi-
vostok are full.1 4 ' The facilities for decommissioning the derelict
submarines are decades behind, 42 and many of the submarines have al-
ready exceeded their designed life expectancy.1
43
137. Natalya Barabash, Will Trestles Save the Nuclear Fleet, KOMOSOLKAYA
PRAVADA, Dec. 15, 1994, at 3, translated in FBIS-Sov-94-242, at 31-33 (Dec. 16 1994),
cited in Kopte, supra note 46, at 24.
138. To see pictures, visit <http://www.bellona.no/imgs/nfl/6lfo58.jpg>
and < http://www.bellona.no/imgs/nfl/61 f057.jpg > at the Bellona website.
139. The incidents referred to in this article represent only a fraction of the ac-
counts that are available concerning the mismanagement of submarines and their waste
releases into the environment. More accident histories can be found online at Bellona
Web (visited Dec. 18, 1998) <http://www.bellona.no>, and at U.S. Peacetime Submarine
Accidents (visited Dec. 18, 1998) <http://freeweb.pdq.net/gstitz/Peace.htm>.
140. See Fred Barbash, Nuclear Specter Rises from Naval Graveyard; Old Soviet
Base Harbors Risk of Catastrophe, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1996, at Al.
141. See Nilsen et al., The Russian Northern Fleet Introduction, supra note 133.
142. See id.
143. See Thomas Nilsen et al., The Russian Northern Fleet Nuclear-Powered Ves-
sels (visited Dec. 18, 1998) <http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/nfl2- 1.htm>.
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A series of cooling pools were built at the Andreeva Bay Nuclear
Waste port on the Kola Peninsula in 1962 and 1973 to house spent nu-
clear fuel. In 1982, the storage pools were leaking. Over the next seven
years, most of the spent nuclear fuel in the building was removed to
storage pools originally designed to store liquid radioactive waste.
144
The water that leaked out of the cooling pools, which were constantly
refilled with fresh water to keep the fuel submerged, is estimated to have
contained 3000 Ci of radioactivity. As these examples illustrate, the
problem created by the need to safely dispose of these radioactive
wastes, and the lack of Russian, or even former Soviet capacity to do the
job, is grave indeed.
IV. LEGAL OVERLAY
A number of international agreements have been concluded that
either relate generally to the issues being discussed, or were concluded
with the express intent to help Russia deal with the problem of nuclear
pollution.
A. Multilateral Agreements"'
Nuclear pollution of the Arctic is covered by a number of treaties
and other instruments, which provide a theoretical basis for holding the
Russians liable for the cleanup of any pollution they may have caused.
These include the 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Conven-
tion), 146 the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy of the Arctic
Council (Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy), 47 and the 1993
Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic (1993 Dec-
144. Not all of the spent nuclear fuel could be removed, and some remains to this
day. To see a recent picture of the inside of the building, see <http://www.bellona.no/
imgs/nfl/61f051.jpg>.
145. This section is based on LAKSHMAN GURUSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER (2d ed. forthcoming 1999)
146. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter Lon-
don Convention].
147. Joint Communique and Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Coun-
cil, Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1382. See also Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy,
June 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1624 (predecessor to the Joint Communique).
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laration).148 The London Convention prohibits the dumping of high-level
nuclear waste. 149 The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, sub-
sumed by the Arctic Council upon its establishment in 1996, calls for
adherence to the strictest relevant international standards. The 1993
Declaration, in addition to reaffirming relevant principles of the 1992
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,'5" Agenda 21,151 and
the Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a
Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable
Development of All Types of Forests,152 proclaims that "decisions re-
lating to Arctic activities must be made in a transparent fashion ... to
facilitate.., appropriate access to information concerning such deci-
sions, ... participation in such decisions and ... judicial and adminis-
trative proceedings.' ' 3
Additional recommendations relating specifically to land-based
pollution include Article 207 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); 5 4 the 1985 Montreal Guidelines for the
Protection of the Marine Environment Against Pollution from Land-
Based Sources; 5 and the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Ma-
rine Environment of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention). 56
Several treaties and instruments of general applicability relate to the
problem at hand, including Part 12 of UNCLOS; 15 7 Principle 21 of the
148. The Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic, Sept.
16, 1993, available in 1993 WL 645202 [hereinafter Nuuk Declaration].
149. See London Convention, supra note 146, art. IV.
150. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), re-
printed in 31 I.L.M. 874 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
151. Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, United Na-
tions Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/4 (1992).
152. Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Con-
sensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of
Forests, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/6/Rev. 1 (1992).
153. Nuuk Declaration, supra note 148, at 6.
154. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 207,
U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.62/122, available in 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
155. Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine Environment Against
Pollution from Land-Based Sources, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG.120/3.Annex (1985), U.N.
Doc. A/40/25 (1985), reprinted in 14 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 77 (1985) [hereinafter
UNCLOS].
156. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East
Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M.1069.
157. See UNCLOS, supra note 154, pt. XII.
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1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment;158 and Princi-
ple 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, 159 which is meant to ensure that ac-
tivities within the signatories' jurisdictions do not cause harm to those
outside their jurisdictions.
While Russia is a party or signatory to all of these instruments ex-
cept for the OSPAR Convention, it may be difficult to hold the country
legally liable under them. For example, Moscow filed a declaration of
non-acceptance to an extension of the London Convention to cover all
radioactive materials. 160 And, the 1993 Declaration as well as the 1992
instruments it reaffirms are widely understood to be legally non-binding.
Moreover, most of these treaties contain exceptions that apply to war-
ships and military craft. For example, the London Convention does not
apply to vessels entitled to sovereign immunity under international
law.' 6 1 Similarly, UNCLOS specifically states that the provisions relat-
ing to the protection and preservation of the marine environment do not
apply to warships or other vessels owned and operated by the state. 1
62
B. Bi- and Trilateral Agreements
1. United States and Russia
Bilateral agreements dealing with nuclear pollution include the
1994 Agreement Between the United States and the Russian Federation
on Cooperation in the Prevention of Pollution of the Environment in the
Arctic. 63 The agreement requires consultation on technical solutions for
the elimination of radioactive and other types of pollution. The 1994
Agreement Between the United States and the Russian Federation on
Cooperation in the Field of Protection of the Environment and Natural
Resources' 64 calls for jointly developed measures to improve the condi-
158. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M.
1416, 1417.
159. See Rio Declaration, supra note 150.
160. See All Signatories to London Convention Except Russia Accept Total Ban
on Dumping, 17 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 156 (Feb. 23, 1994); James Waczewski, Com-
ment, Legal, Political, and Scientific Response to Ocean Dumping and Sub-Seabed Dis-
posal of Nuclear Waste, 7 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 97, 106-07 (1997).
161. See London Convention, supra note 146, art. VII(4).
162. See UNCLOS, supra note 154, art. 236.
163. Cooperation in the Prevention of Pollution of the Environment in the Arctic,
Dec. 16, 1994, U.S.-Russian Federation, available in 1994 WL 761204.
164. See Cooperation in the Field of Protection of the Environment and Natural
Resources, June 23, 1994, U.S.-Russian Federation, available in 1994 WL 449099.
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tion of the environment, including the Arctic. A third agreement, the
1996 Joint Communiqu6 and Declaration on the Establishment of the
Arctic Council, 165 creates an intergovernmental forum to promote effec-
tive cooperation on a wide range of Arctic issues. 166 Finally, the 1996
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United
States and the Russian Federation on Cooperation in Natural and Man-
Made Technological Emergency Prevention and Response 167 establishes
that the two countries will cooperate regarding the development of
emergency preparedness techniques, information sharing, and communi-
cation.
Russia's financial and economic predicament has substantially re-
stricted its ability to comply with START. The United States has as-
sisted Russia through a number of federal programs. 68 Congress has
found that the national security of the United States requires funding of
Russian programs that eliminate nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons.169 This policy has become known as "defense by other
means." 170 Approximately $1.6 billion has been appropriated through
165. Joint Communiqu6 and Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Coun-
cil, Sept. 19, 1996, U.S.-Russian Federation, 35 I.L.M. 1382.
166. See id. The Arctic Council is a permanent high-level intergovernmental fo-
rum whose members consist of eight Arctic states: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. Established in Ottawa on September 19,
1996, the council's purpose is to promote multilateral cooperation and political action to
address a wide range of Arctic issues common to its members, exclusive of matters re-
lated to military security. A key feature of the council is the involvement of the Arctic
region's indigenous peoples. In addition to the eight member nations, three organizations
representing the majority of indigenous peoples in the circumpolar Arctic will be perma-
nent participants: the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Saami Council, and, the Asso-
ciation of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian
Federation. Permanent participation is open to other Arctic organizations of indigenous
peoples not currently represented by these three organizations, provided that they meet
the criteria set out in the 1996 Declaration. Participation is also open to non-Arctic states
and intergovernmental organizations as observers. See id.
167. Cooperation in Natural and Man-Made Technological Emergency Prevention
and Response, July 16, 1996, U.S.-Russian Federation, available in 1996 WL 516876.
168. In the original Nunn-Lugar legislation, the United States allocated $400 mil-
lion towards dismantling the former Soviet Union's military nuclear capacity. See Soviet
Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2551 (1994). Nunn-Lugar was amended in
1992 to recognize the Soviet breakup. See Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act, 22
U.S.C. §§ 5901-5931 (1994). Nunn-Lugar was amended again in 1993, changing the
name of the program to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. See Cooperative
Threat Reduction with States of the Former Soviet Union Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5951-5958
(Supp. 1998).
169. See Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2551 (1994).
170. Id. n.14.
1999]
Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y
Department of Defense bills to fund the Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) program, 171 and a total budget of $3.2 billion is planned for the
CTR.
172
The CTR program is primarily directed at ensuring the safe dis-
posal of nuclear weapons. To this end, the program aids in the safe
transport of dismantled nuclear missiles, pays for the refitting of pluto-
nium enrichment reactors, and pays for the removal of ballistic missiles,
launchers, and heavy bombers under START.
173
START requires the removal of a large number of Russian subma-
rine-launched ballistic missiles, though it makes no mention of the sub-
marines themselves. Accordingly, the initial CTR program at the Rus-
sian naval bases was directed at removing the missiles and their
launchers from the submarines. The CRT did not have any plans for the
submarines themselves. 174 However, the reality that the Russians did not
want to be left dealing with derelict submarines required the CTR to deal
not only with the missiles, but also with the submarines. 175 The CTR
complied, and now has a program through which thirty-one ballistic
missile submarines will be decommissioned by the United States. 176 Ad-
ditionally, when the CTR program began, there was no place to store the
spent nuclear fuel or the reactor vessels after the SSBNs were disman-
171. See Jack M. Beard, A New Legal Regime for Bilateral Assistance Programs:
International Agreements Governing the "Nunn-Lugar" Demilitarization Program in the
Former Soviet Union, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 895, 895 n.3 (1995).
172. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION: STATUS OF THE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM (Letter Re-
port, Sept. 27, 1996, GAO/NSIAD-96-222) (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http://www.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:ns96222.txt> [hereinafter Weapons of
Mass Destruction]. The $3.2 billion figure includes estimated costs through 2001. See id.
173. See Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Mission (visited Mar. 17, 1999)
<http://www.ctr.osd.miil/Olnmissn.htrn>.
174. The CTR program also addresses the reduction of former Soviet Union
chemical weapons, the need for nonproliferation safeguards, and the need for nuclear
material transport and storage. See Weapons of Mass Destruction, supra note 172.
175. Telephone Interview with Colonel Dick Rock, Deputy Director for CTR (Jan.
14, 1999). According to Colonel Rock, the Russian naval bases and the Russian Navy
required that the CTR not only build the infrastructure for removing the missiles, but also
the facility for decommissioning the entire submarines.
176. See Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, SLBM Launcher SSBN Elimina-
tion (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http:/lwww.ctr.osd.millprojects/projrus/rpj-slbm.htm>.
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tled.177 In response, the United States is building a fissile material stor-
age facility at Mayak, in Russia.
78
The CTR program has enjoyed wide bipartisan support and is often
characterized as successful. The Navy staff implementing the program
call it "God's work."' 179 During the past years, the decommissioning of
five nuclear powered submarines has been funded, 180 while four or five
more submarines are to be dismantled with CTR funds this year.1 81
2. Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
The Declaration on Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation1
82
signed by the defense ministers of Norway, Russia, and the United
States, marked the beginning of a process which led to the 1998 Agree-
ment on Environmental Cooperation with the Dismantling of Russian
Nuclear-Powered Submarines Withdrawn from the [Russian] Navy's
Service in the Northern Region, and the Enhancement of Nuclear and
Radiation Safety (Agreement on Environmental Cooperation). 8 3 The
177. See Igor Kudrik, CTR Funds Russian Subs Decommissioning (visited Mar.
17, 1999) <http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/news/981201.htm>; Nilsen et al., The
Russian Northern Fleet Introduction, supra note 133.
178. See Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Fissile Material Storage Facility
(visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http://www.ctr.osd.mil/projects/projrus/rpj-fmsf.htm>.
179. See Rock, supra note 175.
180. See Kudrik, supra note 177.
181. See id. Not all descriptions of the CTR program have been rosy, however.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) of the US Congress criticized the program for
failing to file statutorily required reports, inadequately reflecting budgetary uncertainties
associated with "important developments," and for not having enough data to verify Rus-
sia's control over nuclear materials. See Weapons of Mass Destruction, supra note 172.
The GAO's reference to "important developments" is particularly important. A 1997
White House memorandum on the CTR states that a total of $230 million was spent on
the CTR by the end of 1996, whereas the GAO reports that approximately $1.5 billion
had been committed to the program, and more than $500 million had already been spent
in 1996. Compare supra Table 1, with OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY IN HELSINKI,
FINLAND, FACT SHEET: JOINT STATEMENT ON PARAMETERS ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN
NUCLEAR FORCES (released March 21, 1997) (visited Mar. 17, 1999)
<http://www.usemb.se/press/baltic/ FUTUREREDUCTIONS-FACTS.htm>. Clearly
some parts of the federal government know more about the extent of funding and work
that the CTR is supposed to be completing than others. Information sharing that could
reduce the barriers between federal agencies could be had by implementing a transparent
international environmental planning program for future arms reduction efforts.
182. Declaration on Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation, May 26, 1998,
Norway-Russian Federation, __ I.L.M. (on file with authors).
183. Agreement on Environmental Cooperation with the Dismantling of Russian
Nuclear-Powered Submarines Withdrawn from the Navy's Service in the Northern Re-
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agreement was signed on the occasion of a state visit of Norway's King
Harald V to Russia, including as signatories Norwegian Foreign Minis-
ter Knut Vollebaek and Russian Minister for Nuclear Energy Yevgeny
Adamov.
The 1998 Agreement on Environmental Cooperation enhances nu-
clear safety in the Arctic region, at least between Norway and Russia. In
particular, as provided in Article 1, Norway agreed to render "free tech-
nical assistance" to the Russian Federation "in the form of delivery of
equipment, technology transfer, provision of financial means[,] and
services" for "an early, environmentally safe and cost-effective disman-
tling" of Russia's nuclear powered submarines, "including the manage-
ment of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste ... formed thereby[,]"
and Russia, for its part, agreed to use the free technical assistance pro-
vided by Norway "exclusively for [these] purposes." More particularly,
the agreement expressly enumerated an inexhaustive list of projects to
be covered by it (Article 2), and provided that both Norway and Russia
"will facilitate the involvement of third parties in [the] financing and/or
practical implementation of [such] projects." (Article 8). Finally, the
agreement provided for the establishment of a joint Norwegian-Russian
commission to coordinate and control its implementation (Article 3),
and for arbitration in accordance with internationally recognized arbi-
tration rules in the event of disagreement between the two parties
(Article 9).
It is clear that the formidable challenge of dealing with nuclear
pollution, although accepted by Norway, will require substantial third-
party involvement and support.184 Hence, the 1998 Agreement includes
the September 1996 Agreement as a precondition to Norway's moving
ahead with the 1998 Agreement. Norway's ultimate aim is to help es-
gion, and the Enhancement of Nuclear and Radiation Safety (1998) (on file with
authors).
184. As the 1997 Norwegian Plan of action for Nuclear Safety and the Environ-
ment states:
In the Soviet Union, the safety aspects of nuclear activities were very inade-
quately dealt with, but Russia and the other republics [do not] wish to improve
nuclear safety standards and cleanup pollution. Although much has been done
to improve nuclear safety standards by means of bilateral and multilateral co-
operation, there are still major challenges to be dealt with. Thus, circumstances
now favor cooperation on measures to deal with these problems, but this will
require substantial, well-coordinated international participation in both finan-
cial and technological terms. Norway's efforts alone will be of little avail un-
less it can help to encourage both greater activity by the Russians themselves
and international assistance in the use of appropriate expertise in key areas.
ROYAL NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NUCLEAR SAFETY AND THE EN-
VIRONMENT: PLAN OF AcTION 3 (Feb. 1997).
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tablish a multilateral umbrella mechanism, under which third parties
will enjoy the same terms of cooperation with the Russian Federation as
are now in force on a Norwegian-Russian bilateral basis-providing in-
ter alia for tax and nuclear liability exemption for third parties that may
wish to cooperate on any relevant nuclear safety project in northwest
Russia. Norwegian authorities hope that the bilateral agreement now in
force will form an important building block in establishing such a
mechanism.18 5 This agreement presents an admirable opportunity for the
United States to collaborate in cleaning up the problem created by re-
tired submarines.
V. A PROACTIVE APPROACH
A. The Need for Environmental Impact Assessments
The unquestionable need to be alerted to the global environmental
impact of arms control treaties has been underscored by the previously
unforeseen but now evident threat posed by retired and abandoned nu-
clear submarines in Russian naval ports.186 As we have seen, these sub-
marines have been taken out of service because they have exceeded their
operating life,8 7 because the Russian Navy no longer has the funds to
maintain them,188 or because removing them meets required disarma-
ment efforts under START.189 START addresses the daunting challenge
of reducing the balance of terror created by nuclear weapons through
dramatic cuts in submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 190 The treaty also
deals with the need to safely dispose of huge quantities of weapons,
launchers, and nuclear and fissile materials that were the immediate con-
185. Memorandum from Bjorn Brede Hansen, Embassy Secretary, the Royal
Norwegian Embassy, Washington, D.C., to Professor Bums Weston 2 (Sept. 8, 1998)
(on file with authors).
186. See generally Nilsen et al., The Russian Northern Fleet Radioactive Waste at
the Naval Bases, supra note 133.
187. See Kopte, supra note 46.
188. See id.
189. See US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms Signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991 (visited
Mar. 17, 1999) <http://www.acda.gov/treaties/start/starttex.htm> [hereinafter Offensive
Arms Treaty]; Phase I, supra note 87.
190. See Offensive Arms Treaty, supra note 189.
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sequence of the most successful disarmament program in modern his-
tory. 1
91
Unfortunately, START's focus on weapons of war alone glossed
over the fact that any mismanaged nuclear facility, whether tied to a
military purpose or not, is fraught with potential global risks. START
negotiators embarked on the exciting and laudable pursuit of arms con-
trol, but failed to take into account the dangers of, for example, disman-
tled and abandoned nuclear-powered non-ballistic missile submarines.'
92
In places like Murmansk and Vladivostok, decommissioning non-
ballistic missile submarines poses great risks to the environment.
93
These defanged submarines might be militarily harmless, but nuclear re-
actors are inherently dangerous and will require careful attention.
1 94
Overlooking the global threat posed by retired nuclear submarines
may be attributed to a remarkable "blind spot" in the mind's eye of mo-
tivated arms control negotiators. These law and policy makers, single-
mindedly driven to cutting down nuclear weaponry, ignored well estab-
lished concerns about the different kinds of nuclear threats and environ-
mental impacts created by their high principled undertaking.' 95 It is not
as if these other and different dangers were hidden from the public eye.
On the contrary, during the negotiation of START the effects of the
major chemical explosion that occurred on April 26, 1986 at the Cher-
nobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union made world headlines and
was the topic of a fervent international policy discourse. 96 The fire in
191. The implementation of START has been spurred by the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program. See The White House, U.S. Nunn-Lugar Safety, Security, Disman-
tlement Program (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http://www.acda.gov/factsheelwmdlnuclear
/ctr/ssd32194.htm>.
192. START requires only the reduction of Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
(SLBMs), silos, and launchers. There was no specific directive in START to reduce
SSBNs themselves. See Offensive Arms Treaty, supra note 189.
193. For a discussion of the extent of the Russian problem with decommissioning
non-ballistic missile submarines, see Nilsen et al., The Russian Northern Fleet Radioac-
tive Waste at the Naval Bases, supra note 133.
194. "There can be no doubt that the operation of a nuclear reactor and the han-
dling and testing of nuclear wastes are inherently dangerous activities." Fried v. United
States, 579 F. Supp. 1212, 1216 (N.D. 11. 1983).
195. This is despite the fact that the safe disposition of nuclear materials and the
environmental consequences of unsafe management of nuclear materials has long been
one of the foci of the International Atomic Energy Agency as it sets standard rules for
nuclear power plant safety. See generally International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear
Safety (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http://www.iaea.org/ns>.
196. See, e.g., Walter Sullivan, Nuclear Disaster: A Grim Event Still Unfolding-
More Deaths Predicted, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1986, S1, at 5; Karen DeYoung, Stockholm,
Bonn Ask for Details of Chernobyl Mishap, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1986, at A1, available
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the damaged reactor had released more radioactivity than any previous
nuclear accident. 197 The emission of long-term radiation from Chernobyl
was the equivalent of anywhere from one-tenth to one-sixth of the total
radiation released by the more than 400 nuclear explosions since
1945.198 One hundred and thirty-five thousand people, some living as far
as 100 miles from the plant, were evacuated from the area. 199 Thirty-one
people working at or in the immediate vicinity of the plant died, twenty-
nine of them from radiation sickness. 200 As widely reported at that time,
scientists had become deeply concerned about the long-term effects of
the accident, estimating they would run to tens of thousands of cancer
deaths.20'
The evidence of Russian mismanagement at Chernobyl was over-
whelming. At a special conference of the IAEA held in Vienna in
August 1986, members of the Soviet delegation admitted that the acci-
dent at Chernobyl was largely a result of defective operating procedures
that violated several Soviet safety regulations and that had been fol-
in 1986 WL 2047681; Stuart Diamond, Chernobyl Causing Big Revisions in Global Nu-
clear Power Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1986, at Al; Irvin Molotsky, Chernobyl and
the "Global Village," N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1986, at B22.
197. See The Chernobyl Accident, NUCLEAR NEWS, June 1986, at 87-89.
198. According to a study funded by the US Energy Department's Office of
Health and Environmental Research. See Jillian Barron, Note, After Chernobyl: Liability
for Nuclear Accidents Under International Law, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 647, 647
(1987)
199. See Vladimir Schevchenko & G.P. Signirova, Cytogenic Effects of Ionizing
Radiations on Human Populations, in CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHERNOBYL CATASTROPHE:
HUMAN HEALTH 23 (E.B. Burlakova ed., 1996).
200. See Chernobyl: The Soviet Report, NUCLEAR NEWS (Special), Sept. 11, 1986,
at 1.
201. At that time, the estimates of expected cancer deaths ranged from 5000 to
40,000 for the Soviet Union and from 2000 to 6000 for elsewhere in Europe. See Stuart
Diamond, Chernobyl's Toll in Future at Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1986, at Al. Al-
though the most serious immediate effects of the Chernobyl accident were felt in the
USSR, its impact on commerce and daily life extended as far as Wales, where radioactive
rain and contamination caused the sale of lambs to be temporarily banned at the height of
the usual market season. See Marian Pallister, Return of the Big Bogey, HERALD
(Glasgow), Mar. 16, 1999, at 11. In Italy, the government prohibited the sale of leafy
vegetables. The ban was expected to impose losses of up to one hundred million dollars
on farmers there. See Nuclear Disaster: In Europe, Shivers & Sang Froid; A Vegetable
Ban Dismays Italians, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1986, at A20. Swedish reindeer that had eaten
radioactive lichen were declared unfit for human consumption. See Francis X. Clines,
Chernobyl Shakes Reindeer Culture of Lapps, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1986, at Al. Swed-
ish authorities stated that the consequent loss of 100,000 contaminated reindeer would
threaten the traditional livelihood of the country's Lapp population and possibly the
continued survival of its unique culture. See James M. Markham, Nuclear Nightmares;
Europe is Bracing for Chernobyl's Grim Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1986, at D1.
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lowed without the requisite prior approval of the plant safety authori-
ties.2°2
Following the Chernobyl accident, the international community
moved quickly to codify the responsibilities of operators of reactors in-
volved in accidents and the responsibilities of the states where a nuclear
accident has occurred. The areas of liability that had been addressed
through the Conventions on Third Party Nuclear Liability2°3 were almost
immediately augmented by the Convention on Assistance in the Case of
a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, which entered into force
on February 26, 1987.204 The Convention on Nuclear Accidents came
into force on October 27, 1986.205
Even while arms control experts of the United States were negoti-
ating START, other negotiators headed by the United States were con-
ferring to create the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety.20 6 All this was
in addition to the existing treaties and IAEA safeguards dealing with ci-
vilian nuclear facilities.20 7 It should have been clear to START negotia-
202. See Serge Schmemann, Chernobyl Answers; New Questions, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 1986, at A3.
203. See Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July
29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251; Convention Supplementary to the 1960 Convention on
Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Jan. 31, 1963, 956 U.N.T.S. 265;
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063
U.N.T.S. 265; Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage
of Nuclear Material, Dec. 17, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 255.
204. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency, Sept. 26, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1377.
205. Convention on Nuclear Accidents, Sept. 26, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1369.
206. Convention on Nuclear Safety, Sept. 20, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1514. The conven-
tion was developed out of efforts that began shortly after the Chernobyl accident. Al-
though its framers originally intended to create "a 'framework convention' under which
the parties would commit themselves to a step-by-step strengthening of nuclear safety
and perhaps also create a mechanism for developing substantive protocols making more
precise particular facets of that obligation," the political realities of doing so made such a
framework convention unworkable. Paul C. Szasz, Introductory Note to the Convention
on Nuclear Safety, Sept. 20, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1514.
207. Article IlI(A)(6) of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
Oct. 26, 1956, 276 U.N.T.S. 3, empowers the IAEA to "establish or adopt... standards
of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property," an
activity it has for many years carried out with considerable diligence and technical ex-
pertise in promulgating dozens of "safety standards," including "safety fundamentals,"
"basic safety standards," "operational standards" ("specialized regulations" and "codes of
practice"), "safety guides," "safety practices," and "safety reports." However, the IAEA
has no enforcement function, and in practice, the development of safety standards has
been left up to each country as it sees fit. Nonetheless, the IAEA promulgates model
safety standards that are widely adopted and modified to each nation's needs. To see the
current IAEA safety standards, see International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Stan-
[Vol. 10:2
Nuclear Arms Control
tors that the reactors on the submarines they were contemplating retiring
were very dangerous facilities that needed to be decommissioned with
the same great care and detail as required by the United States when it
decommissions its own submarines. °8
Furthermore, START negotiators should also have been aware of
the much publicized risk posed by the theft of nuclear materials and of
the consequential dangers.0 9 Studies such as those done at Oak Ridge at
the time START was being negotiated had shown how plutonium could
be extracted from spent fuel rods by "bandit nations" for the purpose of
making bombs.210 In spite of this solid body of evidence that called for
an assessment of the global and international environmental impacts of
START, none was undertaken.
In the case of START, it seems that arms controllers themselves are
becoming aware of the environmental problems they have created. This
awareness is illustrated by developments in the Nunn-Lugar legislation
and programs implementing START.21' Programs like CTR212 began by
confining their operation to the dismantling of warheads and missiles,
but now accept the undeniable need to deal with the equally serious is-
sue of dismantling the reactors of nuclear submarines from which these
missiles are launched,213 and for helping the Russian government find a
214home for the spent fuel from these reactors.
It is therefore appropriate to reinforce these developments with
amendments to the Supplementary LEIS for START II, to include the
dard Series (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http://www.iaea.org/ns/nusafe/safstand.htm>. See
also LAKSHMAN GURUSWAMY & BRENT HENDRICKS, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 382-88 (1997).
208. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (describing US, French and Brit-
ish procedures for decommissioning nuclear-powered submarines).
209. See International Atomic Energy Agency, International Safeguards and the
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http://www.iaea.or.at/
worldatom/inforesource/factsheets/safeguards.html>; Gamini Seneviratne, Incoming
IAEA Director Stresses Material Security Needs to Be Improved, 22 NUCLEAR FUEL 12
(Dec. 1, 1997).
210. See Peter Riley, The Legal Control of Nuclear Energy Between States, 21
CAL W. INT'L L.J. 303, 305 (1991).
211. There are now authorizing acts for the Nunn-Lugar Demilitarization Program.
These include the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2551 (1994); the
Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5901-5931 (Supp. 1998); and,
the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5951-5958 (Supp. 1998).
212. See generally Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (visited Mar. 17, 1999)
<http://www.ctr.osd.mil>.
213. See supra note 115.
214. See Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Fissile Material Storage Facil-
ity, supra note 178; Kudrik, supra note 177.
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international environmental impacts of future demilitarization efforts.
This could be accompanied by other steps that would alleviate environ-
mental apprehension about START. As we have seen, the LEIAs under-
taken for START, while assessing the environmental impacts within the
United States, did not take account of the extraterritorial implications of
those treaties. By contrast, during the negotiation of NAFTA, which
took place at about the same time as START, the administration refused
to prepare a formal environmental impact assessment, offering instead a
"review" of the environmental impacts of NAFTA.215 In fact, the ad-
ministration went further by supplementing the main NAFTA text with
side agreements on safety and the environment. 216 Such a precedent
could well be followed in the case of START II.
The fact that Russia and the United States have begun to understand
the decommissioning of submarines as part of the arms control process
does not solve the problem of how to deal with existing abandoned sub-
marines. An analogy can be drawn to domestic US law. While the Re-
sources Conservation and Recovery Act 2 17 operates prospectively to
control waste, it does not address thousands of existing waste dumps.
Congress therefore enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)218 to clean up existing
waste. 19 Similarly, there is a need for the United States and Russia to
find ways of dealing with the existing nuclear submarines in Murmansk
and Vladivostok along with their waste streams.
215. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REVIEW OF US-
MEXICO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1992).
216. See generally North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480.
217. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-580, 90 Stat.
2795 (1976), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (Supp. 1998).
218. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, Pub. L. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (Supp.
1998).
219. See id. See generally Lucia Ann Silecchia, Pinning the Blame & Piercing the
Veil in the Mists of Metaphor: The Supreme Court's New Standards for the CERCLA
Liability of Parent Companies and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 67 FORDHAM L.
REv. 115 (1998); Bruce Howard, A New Justification for Retroactive Liability in
CERCLA: An Appreciation of the Synergy Between Common and Statutory Law, 42 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 847 (1998).
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B. The Applicability of NEPA and Executive Order No.
12,114
Both the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and Execu-
tive Order No. 12,114, provide legal mechanisms through which envi-
ronmental impact assessments could be required for future arms control
treaties. An examination of US case law indicates that while it is possi-
ble that NEPA could be amended to include international environmental
impact assessments, a more feasible course of action would be to amend
Executive Order No. 12,114-dealing with "Environmental Effects
Abroad of Major Federal Actions"-to include ElAs. Such assessments
would lead to the creation of planned, integrated, and efficient programs
for addressing the myriad of problems created by the disarmament of
nuclear military forces, rather than the expensive, haphazard measures
currently being implemented pursuant to START.
A LEIA was prepared for START220 when it was submitted for ap-
proval to the Senate. Article 102(2)(c) of NEPA obligates all federal
agencies making any proposals for legislation to prepare an environ-
mental impact assessment.221 According to the regulations of the Council
on Environmental Quality (CEQ),222 created by NEPA to oversee its im-
plementation,223 the submission of a treaty for ratification is a proposal
for legislation.224 Despite the fact that NEPA explicitly recognizes the
"worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems, 225
220. See United States Department of the Air Force, Legislative Environmental
Impact Statement: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (LEIS START) (Dec. 1991)
[hereinafter LEIS START].
221. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994)
222. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ANNUAL REPORT 27 (1997);
Council on Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1998).
223. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4342 (West
1998) (Council on Environmental Quality).
224. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C)(1994). The Council on Environmental Quality has interpreted requests for
ratification of treaties as proposals for legislation. See Council on Environmental Qual-
ity, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 (1994).
225. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(f) (1994),
reads:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the
policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act, and (2)
all agencies of the Federal Government shall-(F) recognize the worldwide
and long-range character of environmental problems and, where consistent
with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to initia-
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neither the LEIA for START226 nor the supplemental LEIS for START
11227 addressed the environmental impacts of these treaties within the
Soviet Union.
Furthermore, no environmental impact assessments were made un-
der Executive Order 12,114.228 Under this Executive Order, it is arguable
that the action of dismantling and decommissioning nuclear submarines
under START is a major federal action significantly affecting the envi-
ronment of a foreign nation.229 However, the Executive Order exempts
"actions taken by the president, 230 and it may have been felt that Presi-
dential treaty negotiations thus fell outside the of the order's scope.23
NEPA mandated EISs may be required of the Department of De-
fense if it could be successfully argued that the United States, by enter-
ing into arms reduction agreements involving the decommissioning of
hundreds of Russian nuclear submarines, was undertaking a major fed-
eral action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.
Any judicial attempt to require an EIS under NEPA, however, will have
to overcome a number of hurdles. First, the "final agency action" re-
quiing an EIS must be identified.232 Second, NEPA does not apply to
the actions of the president and cannot be invoked where a treaty has
been negotiated by the president.233 Third, the plaintiff may lack stand-
tives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international coopera-
tion in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world
environment. Id.
226. See LEIS START, supra note 220.
227. See United States Department of the Air Force, Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty II (START II) Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (1993).
228. See Exec. Order No. 12,114,44 FED. REG. 1957 (1979).
229. See id. arts. 2-3(c)(2).
230. Id. arts. 2-5(ii).
231. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C.
Cir. 1993); Greenpeace v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990). See also David A.
Koplow, How Do We Get Rid of These Things?: Dismantling Excess Weapons While
Protecting the Environment, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 445 (1995); David A. Wirth, Legitimacy,
Accountability, and Partnership: A Model for Advocacy on Third World Environmental
Issues, 100 YALE L.J. 2645 (1991).
232. See Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (submittal of NAFTA to Congress for ratification was not a final agency ac-
tion subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, § 704, 5 U.S.C. §
555 (1998)).
233. See id. See also Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative, 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1992); Public Citizen v. Office of the United States
Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993); Public Citizen v. Office of the
United States Trade Representative, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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ing.234 Fourth, such a challenge must overcome the presumption against
the extraterritorial application of NEPA.235 Finally, administrative judi-
cial review may be declined by the courts because of the sensitive nature
of the foreign policy issues involved.236
It is likely that efforts to obtain a formal EIS will fail on at least
three of these five grounds. Two decisions of the Court of Appeals,
237
and a third by the District Court for the District of Columbia,238 have se-
verely limited, if not totally crippled, the applicability of NEPA to trade
treaties negotiated by or under the direction of the president. Some of
the principles found in those cases might be equally applicable to arms
control treaties.
In 1991, Public Citizen filed suit to compel the Office of the Trade
Representative (OTR), the designated chief US negotiator of NAFTA, to
provide an EIS while NAFTA was being negotiated (hereinafter Public
Citizen /).239 The District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed
the case for lack of standing2 40 and the D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the
dismissal on other jurisdictional grounds. 241 The Circuit Court held that
NEPA did not create a private right of action and that the plaintiffs' ap-
plication for administrative judicial review must therefore rest on the
Administrative Procedure Act, which permits review only of "final
234. See generally Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
235. See National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749.
236. In National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
for example, it was held to be proper for the NRC to approve the sale for export of a nu-
clear reactor and complementary nuclear materials to the Philippines, without evaluating
the health, safety, and environmental impacts within the recipient nation, because the ex-
port of a nuclear power plant to the Philippines furthered the US goal of non-
proliferation, and was subject to executive review. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647
F.2d 1345. See also Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (a presidential agreement between the
United States and West Germany requiring removal of munitions was not subject to re-
view under the National Environmental Policy Act); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
(a controversy is nonjusticiable (i.e., involves a political question) where there is a
"textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it." Id.).
237. See Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C.
Cir. 1993); Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 970 F 2d 916 (D.C. Cir.
1992).




241. United States Trade Representative, 970 F. 2d 916.
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agency action. 242 Since the final form and language of NAFTA had not
been agreed to, there was no final agency action that could trigger
NEPA.
After NAFTA had finally been negotiated for all intent and pur-
poses, and the president had signed and released a final draft, Public
Citizen sought to compel the OTR to prepare an EIS in Public Citizen
11.243 The District Court ordered the OTR to prepare an EIS, 244 but the
decision was reversed by the D.C. Circuit.245 The Circuit Court reaf-
firmed the rule enunciated in Public Citizen I that only a "final agency
action" can be reviewed.246 It then further extended the restrictions set
up in Public Citizen I, holding that the president is not obligated to sub-
mit any draft, however final, to Congress and that he is free to re-
247
negotiate any portions of NAFTA. According to Public Citizen III,
there is no final agency action until the president submits an agreement
to Congress. Even more ominous for NEPA challenges, it went on to
determine that "if and when the agreement is submitted to Congress, it
will be the result of action by the president, action clearly not reviewable
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 248
Although the majority denied that their decision sounded the death
knell of the legislative EIS,249 Judge Randolph in a separate opinion ap-
peared to think otherwise.250 According to Judge Randolph, the case of
Franklin v. Massachusetts,251 relied upon by the court, held not only that
the president falls outside the APA's definition of "agency," but also
that that action cannot be considered "final" under the APA unless it
"will directly affect the parties. 252 Judge Randolph felt that a proposal
for legislation could not satisfy these conditions. The case of Public
Citizen II1253 appears to support Judge Randolph's position.
In Public Citizen III, the plaintiffs asked that the OTR be required
to prepare an EIS for the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on
242. See id. at 918-19.
243. See Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21
(D.D.C. 1993).
244. See id.
245. See Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
246. See id. at 550, 552.
247. See id. at 551.
248. Id. at 551, 552.
249. See id. at 552.
250. See id. at 553.
251. 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
252. Id. at 797.
253. See Public Citizen v. Kantor, 864 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1994).
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Tariffs and Trade (GATT).254 The District Court found that the action
mirrored the request in Public Citizen H and that the principles set forth
in that case applied to GATT negotiations as well.255 The court reiterated
that NEPA claims for judicial review of trade agreements had been fore-
closed by the two earlier cases, and held that mandamus, as distinct from
256APA relief, was not appropriate. The court then went on to hold that it
was unable to conclude that plaintiffs had suffered an injury sufficient to
confer standing because the domestic effects of the Uruguay round were
so speculative.257
The treaties in the three cases dealt with above followed "fast-
*track" procedures, which provide that Congress must vote on the
agreement, without amendment, within ninety legislative days after
258transmittal by the president. The version of the treaty submitted by the
president in fast-track legislation will, therefore, be identical to the ver-
sion on which Congress will vote. These trade agreement procedures are
quite unlike those applicable to arms control treaties which are subject to
259the advice and consent of two-thirds of the senators present.
Three clear principles arising from the Public Citizen cases apply to
arms control treaties. First, arms control treaties offer even more discre-
tion to the president than do trade agreements on a fast-track. Arms
control treaties only require the advice and consent of the Senate,
whereas trade agreements demand the consent of both houses of Con-
gress. In exercising their advice and consent duties, however, the Senate
is not precluded from suggesting or advising amendments to the treaties
submitted to them. The president is free to accept, reject, or modify the
advice he receives from the Senate. This means that the submission of
an arms control treaty to the Senate for advice and consent does not
make that treaty a "final agency action" that attracts administrative judi-
cial review under NEPA.
Second, the ruling in Public Citizen H regarding the inapplicability
of NEPA to presidential actions may apply to arms control treaties as
well. Public Citizen H bars a plaintiff from obtaining a court order re-
quiring an EIS under NEPA for a treaty that has been negotiated by the
254. See id.
255. See id. at211.
256. See id. at 212.
257. See id. at 214.
258. See Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 550
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
259. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
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president.260 Third, it will be very difficult to satisfy the standing re-
quirement relied upon in Public Citizen III.261
The view taken of NEPA by the three Public Citizen cases must
also affect the status of the CEQ rules that treat requests for "ratification
of treaties," as proposals for legislation which require an EIS. Assuming
that requests for "ratification" refer to the submission of treaties for the
advice and consent of the Senate, and that CEQ regulations stipulate the
need for an LEIS, it is doubtful on the basis of the foregoing analysis
that plaintiffs will find courts willing to enforce the CEQ regulations.
Despite extensive litigation of the issue, the extraterritorial applica-
bility of NEPA remains shrouded in doubt.262 Where federal action af-
fects both the United States and a foreign country, the courts have held
that NEPA applies.263 But NEPA does not apply when the impacts occur
264solely within another country. In the important case of Environmental
Defense Fund v. Massey265 the D.C. Circuit applied NEPA to environ-
mental impacts in Antarctica, holding the presumption against extra-
territoriality inapplicable.266 It also introduced a balancing test to deter-
mine if foreign policy interests outweighed the benefits obtained from an
EIS.26 7 The court narrowed its decision by stating that it did not decide
how NEPA might apply in cases involving an actual sovereign. This
dictum was relied upon in a subsequent case that distinguished Massey
on the grounds that Massey viewed Antarctica as analogous to outer
space, not a foreign sovereign.268 In light of the foregoing case law,
NEPA will probably pass the foreign policy test, but its position on ex-
traterritoriality remains murky. As a result, a plaintiff, even if successful
on the last two grounds, would fail on the first three, and would probably
lose a case seeking a court mandated EIS for arms control treaties.
The United States should retreat from its current, costly and unpre-
dictable methods for helping Russia implement START. Some manner
of international environmental impact assessment or evaluation should
be undertaken when negotiating arms control treaties. Such a move is
260. See United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549.
261. See Public Citizen, 864 F. Supp. 208.
262. See Karen A. Klick, The Extraterritorial Reach of NEPA 's EIS Requirement
After Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 291 (1994); Sierra
Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
263. See Sierra Club v. Mullen, 619 F. Supp. 1244 (1985).
264. See NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir 1981); Greenpeace v. Stone,
748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990).
265. 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
266. See id. at 532.
267. See id. at 534-35.
268. See NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.C. 1993).
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consistent with State Department guidance on treaty negotiation, which
directs diplomats to consider the environmental impacts of international
agreements. 269 The CEQ Regulations, as we have seen, require a LEIS
when a treaty is submitted for ratification. The fact that such a regulation
is not judicially enforceable does not mean that it cannot be applied ad-
ministratively. While arms control treaties hitherto have not considered
international environmental impacts, there are ample reasons and ade-
quate administrative directives to include such global environmental as-
sessments in future LIEAs.
It would be preferable if the EIAs were structured along the lines
required by NEPA. But as we have seen, NEPA may not apply to arms
control treaties. While it is possible that NEPA could be amended to in-
clude international environmental impact assessments, it seems more
feasible for a de facto EIA to be made through the amendment of the
present Executive Order. The existing Executive Order is in need of re-
vision and a new Executive Order would be easier to execute than an
amendment to NEPA.
A comprehensive environmental assessment could have facilitated
an integration of the many fragmented programs now undertaken by
CTR, thus resulting in greater efficiency and effectiveness. Such an ap-
proach would permit the problems of waste disposal facilities and the
cycle of waste to be addressed conclusively. Instead, a number of exam-
ples illustrate the extent to which the present policy of muddling through
has led to expensive ad hoc measures fraught with risk.
First, the CTR is building a temporary waste storage facility at
Mayak that will soon need to be augmented or replaced by a more per-
manent and larger facility. Had the environmental impacts been known,
the program could have anticipated and planned for building much
larger radioactive waste-handling facilities for the huge quantities of
waste that will be created by the decommissioning of non-START sub-
marines.
Building a larger permanent facility, while costing more at the out-
set, would incorporate economies of scale rendering the operation more
efficient. Moreover, a larger plant would enable nuclear waste to be
processed for final disposal instead of awaiting treatment at a temporary
269. See Koplow, supra note 231, at 445, 480 (1995), citing UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, HANDBOOK ON TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS 720-22 (1985).
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stopgap facility. Finally, it would avoid the danger of nuclear wastes in
the temporary facilities being diverted to a weapons program.27 °
Second, in response to Russia's need to decommission over 150
non-START submarines, CTR has paid for and created additional sub-
marine decommissioning capacities in three Russian shipyards that can
handle one to two ships per year.27' The inadequacy of this response is
similar to that of the nuclear waste reprocessing plants, and if the prob-
lems of nuclear dumping are to be avoided this capacity will need to be
made much greater.
Third, the United States and Russia have a cooperative agreement
whereby the United States will purchase highly enriched uranium (HEU)
272from Russia. The HEU is reprocessed from the "pits" of nuclear
bombs, and is reprocessed into a form that can be used as fuel in nuclear
power plants here in the United States. In this way, the special material
that makes up the warheads is transformed into material that would be
very difficult to turn into bombs again.
Had the full environmental impacts of START been known at the
time that the CTR and HEU programs were created, they could have
been combined in a way that used spent fuel from the decommissioned
submarines. Submarine fuel is very highly enriched, sometimes even up
to "weapons grade," so that a submarine can operate for a longer period
of time with infrequent refueling. Power plants use much less enriched
fuel and need to refuel more frequently. Reprocessed spent submarine
fuel, even though "spent" for submarine use, is sufficiently enriched,
after reprocessing, to be used in power plants. Integrating the two pro-
grams would give rise to a number of benefits. Submarine fuel, instead
of requiring a separate reprocessing facility, could be diverted into a
funded program that is capable of dealing with the spent fuel in an ecol-
ogically sound manner. Moreover, the HEU program would have the use
of more accessible raw material that could be reprocessed into nuclear
power plant fuel.273
270. See David Albright et al., Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996:
World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies-Summary (visited Jan. 20, 1999)
<http://www.sipri.se/pubs/pressre/abbk2.html>.
271. See Kudrik, supra note 177.
272. News Release, US and Russian Partners Update Historic Nuclear Agree-
ment: Conversion of Warheads into Electric Power Plant Fuel Continues (visited Sep. 4,
1996) <http://releases.twoten.press.net/releases/date/1996/09/04/NUCLEARAgreement_
Update.html>.
273. The United States performed an EIS for the removal of HEU from its stock-
piles. This document provides a good deal of background information on the issues in-




If START had been accompanied by an international environmental
impact statement that alerted the United States to the much larger price
tag now carried by the CTR program, 274 the United States might have
been inclined to look to international rather than bilateral solutions.
Other members of the international community such as the European
Union, Japan, China, and Korea are closer to the Russian naval yards in
the north and the east than the United States, and have as much, or even
greater stake, in arresting nuclear pollution in the Arctic and the Pacific.
The extent and location of the problem clearly calls for international
solutions and the United States, rather than going it alone, may well
have sought the help of these other nations in finding solutions to this
problem.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Given the evident political and legal concerns surrounding the So-
viet and Russian record of mismanagement of nuclear facilities, the
omission of these important environmental issues in START and its im-
plementing legislation may be explained in terms of interest group poli-
tics. Legal positions are taken by different interests and actors contend-
ing for their competing perception of individual and public interest.
While the regimes governing free trade and environmental protection
215
demonstrate this clash of interests, the same appears to be true of envi-
ronmental protection and arms control. David Koplow points out that
"environmentalism and arms control .... two crucial sectors of Ameri-
can and international public life have long existed in segregated parallel
,,276
universes. He suggests that environmentalists and arms controllers
who viewed themselves as presumptive allies have been torn asunder by
the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).277 Arms controllers,
according to Koplow, see environmental laws as yet another largely ir-
relevant hurdle that must be overcome in order to achieve the security
objectives of the CWC. Environmentalists, on the other hand, see the
CWC as yet another of the diverse threats to ecological stability, so
274. Congress originally allocated $400 million, but as of 1998 has allocated $1.6
billion, and CTR plans on needing $3.2 billion. See Weapons of Mass Destruction, supra
note 172.
275. See Lakshman Guruswamy, The Promise of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): Justice in Trade and Environment Disputes, 25
ECOLOGY L.Q. 189, 190 (1998).
276. Koplow, supra note 231, at 446.
277. See id. at 562.
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278
many of which speciously claim to represent urgent national priorities.
While Koplow offers a cogent explanatory principle, his conclusions
should be tested on a case-by-case basis. In the case of START, there
appears to be a confluence of two streams of thinking that are flowing in
the direction of environmental assessments. The result is a synthesis
rather than a divergence of two perspectives that is contrary to an inter-
est group hypothesis.
The START treaty and its implementing CTR program have dem-
onstrated the need for environmental impact assessments that could lead
to an integrated, rather than a fragmented, approach to arms control and
environmental protection. Such a comprehensive approach must engage
the community of nations, and cannot remain the bilateral or trilateral
concern of the United States, Norway, and Russia. A new Executive Or-
der making international environmental assessments obligatory in cases
of arms control treaties would be a substantial step in the direction of
finding an international response to international environmental prob-
lems.
278. See id.
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